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THE ORGANIZATION OF NATIONAL HEALTH
INSURANCE IN CANADA
Tounderstand the structure of health care legislation in Canada,
one must begin with federal-provincial relations. The division of
powers between the federal government in Ottawa and the ten
provincial governments is Canada's longest and most carefully
defended border, and this division of powers (based on sections 91
and 92 of the British North America Act) clearly designates health
This paper owes a great deal to initial discussions with Uwe Reinhardt, At the conference,
Herbert Kiarman and Anne Scitovsky, the discussants, were both very helpful, as were Victor
Fuchs, Lee Soderstrom, and other participants. Their improving influence should be obvious;
the rest is mine.
Data used in the text are not separately referenced; a detailed discussion of sources is given in
the appendix.
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L,as a matter for provincial jurisdiction.1 In a strict sense, there cannot acting alon
be "national" health insurance in Canada; rather, there are ten eligibility a
separate "provincial" health insurance plans. Federal jurisdiction In brief,
is limited to Indians, Eskimos, sick mariners, and the Armed inces,
Forces, and to a variety of specific services such as quarantine, comprehen
immigration, food and drug control, and many other small areas. agency.6 P
And yet quite obviously there is a national health program venting
covering hospital and medical care (with minimal specific exclu- dropping 11
sions)for almost all Canadian residents. It came about through a public, non
constitutional subterfuge whereby the federal government con- zation beli
tributes a significant share of the total operating costs to any provin- minimal ov
cial plan meeting certain specified federal standards. The constitu- as
tional niceties thus are preserved, and indeed no province was regressive
forced to follow the federal lead and set up a conforming plan. revenue flu
Sincethe formulas for cost sharing cover roughly 50 per cent of prehensive
each provincial plan's total operating costs, however, the financial the
pressures on the provinces to set up qualifying plans were irresist- they can b
ible.2 The Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act of 1957 sumers to
specified July 1, 1958, as the earliest date on which federal cost closed pan
sharing for hospital care became available. Newfoundland, Sas- if his plan
katchewan, Alberta, and B.C. already had operating hospital plans earn such
that qualified for cost sharing and Manitoba initiated a plan on that agreeing n
date. The pressure on the remaining provinces brought in Prince Furtheri
Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Ontario in 1959, delivery ai
and finally Quebec in 1961. A similar scenario followed the passage are acutely
of the Medical Care Act; B.C. and Saskatchewan had qualifying provincial
plans on July 1, 1968, and Manitoba, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland,
Alberta, and Ontario initiated plans at various dates during 1969. a shareabl
Quebec and Prince Edward Island set up plans toward the end of creates ste
1970, and New Brunswick joined at the beginning of 1971. Thus plans—am
1971 is the first complete year of Canadian experience with both wise the i
hospital and medical insurance. It is also the latest year for which care facili
expenditure data of all forms are currently available.3 hospital
The federal standards/shared funding/provincial administration federal co!
structure that is required by the Canadian constitutional structure is commitme
very clearly a mixed blessing. On the positive side, national steady pre
average-based cost sharing makes possible a more uniform level of has stimu.
service availability insofar as the federal contribution rises propor- system an
tionately in the poorer provinces. Relating the federal contribution governme:
to national averages of expenditure brings itupover 60 per cent of the provin
hospital spending and over 80 per cent of medical spending in the revenues
poorest provinces,4 thus permitting a national standard of health however,
services that would have been quite out of reach of the provinces out.8
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acting alone.5 But the total effects of the minimum criteria for
eligibility are much less clear.
In brief, these criteria are portability of coverage across prov-
inces, universal access on equal terms and conditions to all,
comprehensive coverage, and administration by a nonprofit public
agency.6 Portability clearly works to the general interest by pre-
venting cost-conscious provincial agencies from finding ways of
dropping migrants out of the system, while the requirement of
public, nonprofit administration specified the initial form of organi-
zation believed most likely to achieve the other objectives with
minimal overhead cost.7 Universal access is becoming less relevant
as provinces are recognizing that "premiums" represent a rather
regressive poll tax and are shifting over time to total general
revenue financing. But "equal terms and conditions" and "com-
prehensive coverage" do in fact impose significant limitations on
the modifications that can be made on the supply side, insofar as
they can be interpreted as prohibiting incentives directed at con-
sumers to choose one form of delivery over another. A user of a
closed panel plan, for example, could not receive a premium rebate
if his plan were shown to use fewer hospital days, nor could one
earn such a rebate by signing up with a well-baby clinic and
agreeing not to use a pediatrician unless referred by the clinic.
Furthermore, cost sharing both distorts the structure of care
delivery and dilutes incentives to economize. Provincial agencies
are acutely aware of what services are or are not cost shareable; no
provincial bureaucrat worthy of the name would allocate funds for a
non-shareable program if the same result could be attained through
a shareable route, even if the former were cheaper. This problem
creates steady pressure to expand the coverage of the provincial
plans—ambulatory care in hospitals must be insured since other-
wise the insurance plan leads to excess hospitalization; extended
care facilities should be covered in order to reduce acute care
hospital use. Home care programs should also be subsidized with
federal cost sharing. Thus, the open-ended nature of the federal
commitment to currently covered services, combined with the
steady pressure to "rationalize" utilization by expanding coverage,
has stimulated interest in ways of dismantling the cost-sharing
system and transferring full fiscal responsibility to the provincial
governments. In return, the federal government would release to
the provinces a larger share of personal income tax revenues, and/or
revenues from other federal taxes (alcohol and tobacco). As yet,
however, no package acceptable to both sides has been worked
out.8
439 Insured Health Care in CanadaThe provinces finance their share of the cost of hospital and conditions" medical care by a mix of taxes. Many provinces introduced retail significant
sales taxes at the time the hospital plans were set up, and in some circumstan
cases these were initially labeled hospital taxes. This revenue is not B.C. exten
earmarked, however, and merely flows into general revenue. All cient to mo provinces receive a share of the federal personal and corporate cumulating
income tax collected from their residents. Quebec also levies its charges are
own personal income tax as well as an 0.8 per cent payroll tax although o
• introduced along with Medicare. The federal income tax was knows.
augmented by a "Social Development" surtax of 2 per cent ($100 There is
• maximum) when Medicare was introduced, each provil
Revenue sources specifically associated with the hospital and plans were
medical insurance plans include "premiums" in some provinces discount fr
and in a few, "utilization charges," but the universal access condi- for the rech
tion of federal participation restricts the role of such charges.9 Thus per cent or
the premium must not interfere with the requirement that 99 per allowed to cent of the population be insured—this requirement can be more, som
achieved by compulsion (making the premium a poll tax), by setting the fee sch
premiums well below expected cost per family (which would province f
exclude nonpayers who have already paid most of the cost through they mighi
other taxes), or by relatively high premiums combined with sub- physician s
sidies to low-income families (making the poll tax less regressive patient as
but more costly to administer). The regressiveness, expense of letthepati'
administration, and general pointlessness of the premium system is or the pal
slowly leading provincial governments toward full general revenue
•reimburse
financing of integrated medical and hospital "insurance." There are above plan
still a few voices raised arguing that premiums are desirable as a
• B.C.the p1
utilization control; if people are aware of the costs of the plans they fee schedu
may use less. No evidence for this argument has ever been written co
adduced, however, any more than for the contrary position that the B.C.
visible premiums lead people to "get their money's worth." In any But the pa
case, current premiums in no way reflect plan costs and could not the practic
be made to do so. They appear to be a transitional feature only. inces whe
A scattering of utilization charges persists, without clear
• Th
rationale. Thus, B.C. charges $1.00 per day of hospital inpatient Canadian
stay, and $2.00 per visit to a hospital outpatient department. If the ec
Saskatchewan experimented with a $2.50 physician office visit fee are
and $2.50 per day hospital charge in 1968 but dropped both in 1971. those bets
It appears that the result of the medical charge was to reduce whole sys
utilization on balance by lowering use by lower-income groups and designers
raising use by upper-income groups.'° In general, the purpose of as little
the public plans is to reduce the inequality of access to services by merely to
income class.hl And the "universal access on equal terms and transactiol
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lual terms and
conditions" principle is not consistent with utilization fees having a
significant effect on use. Thus they are restricted to specific
circumstances; it is proposed, for example, that elderly patients in
B.C. extended care facilities should be charged a daily rate suffi-
cient to mop up their monthly federal old age pensions rather than
cumulating these payments for their heirs. But most utilization
charges are said to cost as much to collect as they return in revenue,
although of course the costing has never been done, so no one
knows.
There is, however, a patchwork of arrangements, differing in
each province, governing physician bills to the patient. When the
plans were introduced, many provinces reimbursed physicians at a
discount from the fee schedule (90 per cent or 85 per cent) to allow
for the reduced uncollectable ratio. Treatment of the remaining 10
per cent or 15 per cent varied. In some provinces the physician was
allowed to try to collect these amounts from the patient. Further-
more, some provinces permit physicians to bill the patient above
the fee schedule—in Ontario physicians began after 1969 to bill the
province for 90 per cent and then to bill the patient for whatever
they might get. This practice was prohibited in 1971. Now if a
physician submits a bill to the plan, he is not permitted to bill the
patient as well. If he chooses, he bill the patient directly and
let the patient bill the plan. In Quebec, physicians may bill the plan
or the patient at plan rates; in the latter case the patient is
reimbursed. Only "nonparticipating" physicians may bill patients
above plan rates, and their patients will not be reimbursed at all. In
B.C. the physician may bill the patient directly, up to or above the
fee schedule, if he has notified the patient in advance and obtained
written consent. Otherwise the patient is not obligated to pay, and
the B.C. Medical Association must disallow the bill if challenged.
But the patient doesn't know this! It is not known how significant
the practice of extra-billing direct to the patient is in those prov-
inces where it is permitted, but informed opinion is that it is
trivial. This would seem to agree with the public perception of
Canadian medical care as "free."
If the economic relationships between third-party and consumer
are relatively uninteresting in the Canadian insurance system,
those between payment agency and provider are the heart of the
whole system. Initially, it appears to have been the intent of the
designers of both hospital and medical insurance plans to intervene
as little as possible in the process of health service supply and
merely to pay legitimate charges arising from an independent
transaction between patient and provider. This may be an over-
441
IInsured Health Care in Canadasimplified view of the hospital insurance plan, since the federal earnings p
requirements went beyond mere audit to ensure legitimacy of Brunswick,
charges and included inspection and supervision to upgrade the picture em
quality of hospital services. However, the belief appears to have
been that as long as hospitals and paying agencies were organized
as not-for-profit entities, their economic behavior could safely be
disregarded. In establishing the medical care plan, economic be-
havior of providers seems to have been ignored without even the Province
safeguard of not-for-profit providers!
kh The implicit model of the delivery system underlying this ap- BC
atc ew
proach was the naive medico-technical view of disease conditions r 1 Newiounak arising independently in the population, requiring necessary care Nova Scotia
as defined by medical technology, and generating costs, again
according to a fairly well-defined production technology and price Manitoba
structure. Expenditures for medical and hospital care were of Alberta
course expected to rise insofar as it was believed that in the Quebec
pre-insurance period patients were failing to seek "needed" care P.E.I.
because they could not afford it, or providers were giving "charity" New Bruns'
services on a volunteer basis. But nowhere in the legislation or
SOURCESD
proceduresestablishing either insurance plan was there any recog-
nition that all three components of the delivery process—care
seeking, choice of technique, and input costs—might shift in The fin
response to insurance coverage, inflation,
Care seeking in response to health status stimuli is likely to the drama
increase. This is the obvious response of demand to price, but occurred i
appears to be a relatively small component of the Canadian insur- pattern of
ance experience. Shifts also occur in definitions of best-practice workers bi
health technology—more is performed at greater expense for any In fact,
given disease state. And most difficult of all to deal with, health insurance
providers at all levels, from physicians down through hospital ing a poli
janitors, seem to have revised their income aspirations upward in
response to the observation that the payment process was open- tory activi
ended. If medical care payments were to be made according to fee impose re
schedules promulgated by medical associations alone, what be- conditions
sides adjustment lags limits physicians' fees and incomes? If disallowai
hospital budgets are increased as required to cover wages But other
negotiated by an increasingly unionized labor force, what besides provision
the public spirit of trustees and administrators limits wage levels? healthy ai
And so it has turned out that the single most prominent influence of The uni
health insurance in Canada has been to increase the earnings of federal pa
health providers.'2 tion of a fo
If one examines the net earnings of physicians, comparing their "budget r
first full year of experience under insurance with their last year of bursed by
442 Evans 443 Iiisince the federal
ire legitimacy of
n to upgrade the
f appears to have
s were organized








tal care were of







nuli is likely to

















heir last year of
earnings prior to insurance (a two-year span, except for New













Saskatchewan 1961—63 36.5% 6.6% 28.0%
B.C. 1967-69 14.5 13.0 1.3
Newfoundland 1968—70 36.3 18.7 14.8
Nova Scotia 1968—70 45.2 18.2 22.8
Ontario 1968—70 21.5 15.9 4.8
Manitoba 1968—70 48.1 15.3 28.4
Alberta 1968—70 19.4 18.6 0.7
Quebec 1969—71 51.0 15.6 30.6
P.E.I. 1969—71 70.1 11.2 53.0
New Brunswick1969—71 34.6 17.1 14.9
SOURCES: Data appendix.
The final column adjusts for changes in the overall rate of
inflation, which was accelerating in the late sixties, and brings out
the dramatic gain in the relative income status of physicians that
occurred in the insurance period. As will emerge below, the same
pattern of dramatic income gains has also been true for hospital
workers but over a longer time perspective.'3
In fact, the peculiar federal-provincial structure of the Canadian
insurance scheme militates against expenditure controls. In adopt-
ing a policy of "pay the bills," the federal government merely
recognized its lack of constitutional authority to engage in regula-
tory activity with respect to the. provincial plans. It could of course
impose requirements to check fraud or raise quality standards as
conditions for federal funding, and it went further to permit
disallowance of claims for "medically unnecessary" procedures.
But other than placing some limits on elective surgery, this
provision has been empty. There is no payment limit for removal of
healthy appendixes or for ritual tonsillectomies, for example.
The uniform standards of accounting for hospitals required by the
federal participation agreement have, however, led to the genera-
tion of a formidable data base detailing the operations of each of the
"budget review" hospitals in Canada whose services are reim-
bursed by the provincial agencies. This set of data is remarkable,
443 Insured Health Care in Canadanot only for the vast amount of detailed information that it provides services (w
on the activities of hospitals, levels and patterns of output, utiliza- supply, lal
tion and cost of inputs, and so on, but also for the surprisingly weak (diagnostic
management and control tool it has turned out to be. When the need services, a
arises to make estimates of the full costs of particular activities in educationa
Canadian hospitals, or the relative costs of hospitals engaged in or students
similar activities, the data require vigorous massage to yield ap- general
proximate answers. The reporting systems installed at the time plant, and
hospital insurance was initiated are descriptive and epidemiologi- expense fo
cal rather than managerial control systems—suitable for a strategy supplies at
of minimal intervention by the public agency—in spite of their and surgic
level of detail. cated. Rep
Standard hospital reports in Canada are of several types. Each but also a
hospital returns annually federal reports HS-1 and HS-2 providing term), adn
information on facilities, services, and finances. In addition, each standard
patient discharged generates a form documenting the episode for clinic, pou
reimbursement purposes which is returned to the provmcial agency. however, r
The basic content of these returns is standardized nationwide. Each Compar
provincial payment agency may impose its own budgetary returns, and publis
overlapping or extending the HS-11 and HS-2. Finally, hospitals may medical p1
participate in a quarterly federal survey of major hospital indicators provider/p
(partial HS-1 and HS-2) or return data to nonprofit agencies such as contacts ai
PAS or HMRI. But the federal statistical returns and the patient grew out
discharge forms, covering the whole population of hospitals and ment plan
patients, respectively, form the backbone of the system. cians had
The discharge forms report patient name, age, address, dates of fee schedt
admission and discharge, attending physician, discharge diagnosis cal associt
(primary and secondary), and surgery andlor anesthesia if any. They and paid
provide a comprehensive picture of the in-hospital morbidity These s
patterns of the Canadian population, as well as of the case-mix of procedi
structure of each hospital. Unfortunately, none of this data can be Thus one
directly linked either to ambulatory care or to the cost structures of particular
specific hospitals. Much work can be done on the age and regional first and s
structure of morbidity, regional patttems of patient flow, etc., but it partial
is only within the past five years that provinces have seriously Data are i
tackledthe problems of machine processing these data. Within out, althoi
another five years most provinces will have established common data at all
patient and physician identifiers linking ambulatory and hospital except for
records, but current ambulatory reporting is by fee schedule item age, resid
and thus is procedural rather than diagnosis-specific. and some
The hospital statistical returns are institution-specific, keyed to but billinl
line-item input budgets. They have been modified over time, but in eligible tc
their present form they divide all hospital expenditure into nursing reimbursi
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services (wards, operating and recovery rooms, emergency, central
supply, labor and delivery rooms, and nursery); special services
(diagnostic and investigative units, special clinics, ambulatory
services, and services such as pharmacy, physiotherapy, etc.);
educational services (direct costs only of salaries or stipends to staff
or students in medical, nursing, or other educational programs); and
general services (administration, laundry, linen, records, physical
plant, and all other nonclinical services). Each area reports direct
expense for salaries and paid hours (medical and nonmedical) and
supplies and other expenses. Separate totals for drugs and medical
and surgical supplies are reported hospital-wide but are not allo-
cated. Reports include not only cost and personnel input by area,
but also a range of physical outputs—patient days (short and long
term), admissions, discharges, deliveries, lab tests done (on a
standard unit basis), radiological films taken, visits to each class of
clinic, pounds of laundry processed, meal days produced, etc. (Not,
however, stamps licked by administrative staff.)'4
Compared to this vast array of data, much of which is tabulated
and published and all of which is now on tape, the records of the
medical plans are relatively sketchy. Medical data are generated by
provider/patient contacts only, whereas hospital data report both
contacts and annual descriptions of providers. The medical plans
grew out of private, nonprofit, often physician-sponsored prepay-
ment plans (see Shillington, 1972) in which participating physi-
cians had agreed to accept payment according to uniform provincial
fee schedules promulgated independently by the provincial medi-
cal association. These plans recorded only who did what to whom
and paid accordingly.
These schedules vary from province to province, and definitions
of procedures tend to shift both over time and across provinces.
Thus one can be fairly sure about how many surgical operations of a
particular type were performed; but, for example, the line between
first and subsequent office visits (same condition), or general and
partial examinations, is very blurred and seems to shift over time.
Data are not generally collected on why procedures were carried
out, although some provinces also request diagnostic data. And no
data at all are collected on provider units (employees, capital, etc.)
except for the information required by medical associations (name,
age, residence, date and place of medical graduation, specialty)'5
and some additional data on billing (whether solo practice, grouped
but billing separately, or grouped but billing jointly, whether or not
eligible to bill as a specialist) required by the payment agency in
reimbursing claims.
445 Insured Health Care in CanadaThe weakness of both of these data collection systems is that they
provide no link between costs and inputs, and any meaningful
measure of output. Hospitals measure direct costs by department,
but departmental services are not independently costed out or
related back to patients and overhead cost is not allocated. Thus
one can calculate direct laundry cost per pound of laundry pro-
cessed for any hospital in the land, but in no hospital can one do more
than estimate (rather crudely) the division of budget into inpatient,
outpatient, and educational expense. Moreover, linkages between
cost structure and patterns of patient output seem to have been
examined only by academics; the public reimbursing agencies have
not generally tried to relate cost to diagnostic mix in any systematic
way in spite of the fact that they are consequently unable to make
any but very crude cross-hospital or cross-time comparisons.t6
"Similarities" among hospitals for budget review purposes are
assumed on the basis of indicators like size and location, rather than
specific information on workload. Budgetary over-runs or requests
for further funding are difficult to evaluate since changes in output
patterns (diagnostic mix, length of stay or occupancy) are not
related to changes in cost patterns. Thus when the initial relatively
permissive attitude toward hospital expenditure began to harden in
the mid-sixties, adequate informational tools to interpret and con-
trol cost escalation were simply not available.
A similar problem underlies medical care statistics. At first glance
it might appear that fee schedules provide a firm price fixed to
levels of output. Initially it was argued that fee schedules should
remain the prerogative of medical associations, with government
carrying on the "hands off" policy of itsprivate, physician-
sponsored predecessors.'7 The enormous increases in physician
incomes and effective (though not list) prices before and during the
introduction of Medicare eliminated that idea rather swiftly. In
most provinces now, fee schedules are de facto negotiated with
provincial governments although the process is often obscure to
preserve the appearance of professional autonomy.'8
The weakness in the process, of course, is that fee schedules
price procedures, not care episodes. The mix and definition of
procedures used during an episode can be and are varied at the
discretion of the physician. Thus rates of payment to physicians
tend to clinib steadily over time, even given constant fee schedules;
prior to Medicare this phenomenon could be explained by chang-
ing collection ratios but it has persisted since. Moreover, levels of
procedures seem to depend on the available supply of physicians,
as much as on the demographic structure of the population.'9 The
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profession and the paying agencies have responded in some prov-
inces by developing "provider profiles" showing the patterns of
procedures performed by individual physicians relative to groups
of similar physicians (by region and specialty). These monitoring
systems identify practitioners with unusual billing patterns (rates
more than two standard deviations away from norm) and thus help
to draw all providers toward uniform patterns. But they leave
unanswered crucial questions such as: How well are procedures
performed? Should they be performed at all? What is happening to
patterns over time? Profile monitoring provides information neither
on quality of care nor on the benefit from steady increases over time
in procedural volume. It merely isolates a very few cases of
apparent malfeasance. Like hospital audit, it is an instrument to
detect fraud, not to manage performance.
The spectacular movements in hospital and medical expendi-
tures in Canada, which we will now move to discuss in some detail,
can thus be related, first, to a relatively naive initial policy of paying
the legitimate bills and minimizing management intervention on
the supply side,2° and second, to an inadequate information struc-
ture on which to base efforts at management. The statistical record
can be analyzedto try to observe what did (and did not) happen as
national insurance was introduced; this will provide a backdrop for
discussing the policy responses that have been attempted and that
are now recommended.
THEQUANTITATIVE IMPACT OF NATIONAL
HEALTH INSURANCE
Historical Patterns of Health Care Expenditure
Theinterpretation of patterns of use of and expenditure on health
care in Canada, before, during, and after the introduction of the two
national health insurance plans, is a complex problem that must be
pursued at the level of particular classes of institutions and often of
individual provinces. But an initial overview of the industry is
provided by the data in tables 1 to 3, showing the distribution of
personal health care spending from 1953 to 1971 in current dollars,
current dollars per capita, and percentage of personal income. The
effects of introducing first hospital and then medical insurance
show up in the expenditure series for general and allied specialhospitals and for physicians, which dominate personal health care
spending. Personal health care spending in turn makes up about
three-quarters of national health expenditures in Canada. The
conceptual differences are discussed in the appendix.
The first thing that commands attention in the Canadian health
care industry is the rapid growth in its level of expenditures. This
increase is, of course, an international phenomenon, but in Canada
the pattern of increase correlates well with extensions in insurance.


















































1953 280.4 123.6 176.6 60.5 48.8 689.9
1954 314.0 132.8 188.6 66.4 52.1 753.9
1955 342.4 137.6 206.5 68.6 59.5 814.6
1956 380.8 149.0 240.1 81.5 71.8 923.2
1957 422.9 164.5 271.8 85.0 103.2a
1958 462.3 178.3 301.3 90.5 112.4 1144.9
1959 543.7 191.9 325.7 99.0 130.2 1290.5
1960 640.6 204.4 355.0 109.6 132.6 1442.2
1961 722.1 226.9 388.3 116.7 135.8 1589.9
1962 811.8 242.3 406.1 121.5 144.4 1726.2
1963 909.8 265.1 453.4 136.9 161.7 1922.0
1964 1015.1 285.1 495.7 147.8 178.6 2122.3
1965 1144.5 317.4 545.1 160.1 211.5 2378.6
1966 1319.0 349.0 605.2 176.4 232.0 2682.3
1967 1523.0 393.3 686.2 187.2 265.5 3055.1
1968 1790.0 428.4 788.1 213.7 297.3
1969 2024.7 476.6 901.4 239.7 318.5 3960.9
1970 2302.6 523.5 1028.9 262.1 360.4 4477.5
1971 2594.6 557.4 1236.2 298.8 422.5 5109.5
Annual % change
1953—1959 11.7 7.6 10.7 8.6 12.3 11.0
1959—1965 13.2 8.7 9.0 8.3 8.4 10.7
1965—1971 14.6 9.8 14.6 11.0 12.2 13.6
1953—1971 13.2 8.7 11.4 9.3 10.6 12.0
'The definitions underlying the prescription drug expense series changed in this year. Annual average








































































TABLE 2 Per Capita Expenditure on Personal Health Care
in Canada, 1953—1971 ($ million)
General and .
Allied
, Special Other Prescription
HospitalsHospitalsPhysiciansDentistsDrugs Total
1953 18.89 8.32 11.90 4.08 3.29 46.47
1954 20.54 8.69 12.34 4.34 3.41 49.32
1955 21.81 8.77 13.15 4.37 3.79 51.90
1956 23.68 9.27 14.93 5.07 4.46 57.41
1957 25.46 9.90 16.36 5.12 6.21a 63.06a
1958 27.07 10.44 17.64 5.30 6.58 67.03
1959 31.09 10.98 18.63 5.66 7.45 73.81
1960 35.77 11.41 19.82 6.12 7.40 80.53
1961 39.52 12.42 21.25 6.39 7.43
7.76
87.02
1962 43.61 13.02 21.82 6.53 92.74
1963 47.97 13.98 23.91 7.22 8.53 101.61
1964 52.53 14.75 25.65 7.65 9.24 109.82
1965 58.16 16.12 27.70 8.13 10.75 120.87
1966 65.79 17.44 30.19 8.80 11.57 133.80
1967 74.61 19.27 33.62 9.17 13.01 149.67
1968 86.35 20.67 38.02 10.31 14.34 169.69
1969 96.29 22.66 42.87 11.40 15.15 188.36
1970 107.96 48.24 12.29 16.90 209.94
1971 120.15 25. 57.24 13,84 19.56 236.61
Annual % change
1953—1959 8.7 4.' 7.8 5.6 9.5 8.2
1959—196511.0 6.8 6.2 6.3 8.6
1965—1971 12.9 12.9 9.3 10.5 11.8
1953—1971 10.8 6.5 9.1 7.0 8.5 9.9
'See note to Table 1.
largest and fastest growing. Moreover, in each case the introduction
of the national insurance plan is associated with significant in-
creases in expenditure. In 1959 hospital insurance covered all
provinces except Quebec—in 1959 and 1960 hospital expenditures
were up nearly 18 per cent in each year. No other year in the period
matches these. Medical care insurance was phased in province by
province from 1968 to 1971—in 1969 and 1970 annual expenditure
increases were over 14 per cent. In 1971 they jumped to 20 per
cent. If we look only at these "leading sectors" and compute the
L
j
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1953 1.43 0.63 0.90 0.31 0.25 3.53
1954 1.59 0.67 0.96 0.34 0.26 3.82
1955 1.61 0.65 0.97 0.32 0,28 3.83
1956 1.62 0.63 1.02 0.35 0.31 3.92
1957 1.68 0.65 1.08 0.34 0.41a
1958 1.73 0.67 1.13 0.34 0.42 4.30
1959 1.93 0.68 1.16 0.35 0.46 4.59
1960 2.17 0.69 1.20 0.37 0.45 4.88
1961 2.40 0.75 1.29 0.39 0.45 5.29
1962 2.48 0.74 1.24 0.37 0.44 5.28
1963 2.62 0.76 1.30 0.39 0.47 5.54
1964 2.73 0.76 1.33 0.40 0.48 5.70
1965 2.79 0.77 1.33 0.39 0.52 5.80
1966 2.87 0.76 1.32 0.38 0.50 5.83
1967 3.02 0.78 1.36 0.37 0.53 6.05
1968 3.22 0.77 1.42 0.38 0.53
1969 3.28 0.77 1.46 0.39 0.52 6.42
1970 3.46 0.79 1.55 0.39 0.54 6.74
1971 3.54 0.76 1.68 0.41 0.58 6.96
Annual %change
1953—19595.1 1.3 4.3 2.0 5.9 5.0
1959—19656.3 2.1 2.3 1.8 2.1 4.0
1965—19714.0 —0.2 4.0 0.8 1.8 3.1
1953—19715.2 1.0 3.5 1.6 2.5 3.7
'See note to Table 1.
share of total hospital and medical expenditures going to hospitals
over this period, the movements in this share correlate precisely
with the introduction of the two national plans. The hospital share
drifted from 61.4 per cent in 1953 down to 60.5 per cent in 1958,
then began a steady rise until 1968, when it peaked at 69.4 per cent.
By 1971 it was down to 67.7 percent.
The same coincidence of timing appears in Table 3. The total
expenditure and expenditure per capita data are muddled by
accelerating general inflation trends but the personal income share







































It is thus o
population
450 Evans 45i1Insshare of income fastest in the 1959—1965 period, whereas medical
spending moved up fastest in the 1965—1971 period. From 1958 to
1961 the hospital share rose 38.7 per cent, or 11.5 per cent per year;
from 1953 to 1958 and from 1961 to 1971 it rose about 4 per cent per
year. The physician series is less dramatic, but it is clear that the
upward trend accelerated after 1966. Clearly, public insurance has
been closely associated with significant jumps in spending.2'
But the mechanism isless obvious. Conventional economic
explanations might focus on the pressure of increased demand on
relatively inelastic supply, leading to a combination of utilization
and price increase. There is reason to believe that demand-driven
adjustments were not very important in the Canadian experience;
this will emerge from the more detailed discussion below. A
suggestion that supply-side factors may be of considerable impor-
tance emerges, however, if we point out that the relative availabil-
ity of physicians and hospital beds also shifted over this period.
General and allied special beds per fee-practice physician reached
a peak of 7.18 in 1966, having drifted up slowly from 7.00 in 1958.
From 1968 to 1971, however, they dropped over 10 per cent, from
7.12 to 6.38. The increase in physician share was associated with a
rapid increase in the relative availability of physicians, far too rapid
to be a response to insurance-induced demand. Noting also that the
mid-1950s saw a rapid increase in the relative availability of
hospital beds (Table 4 below), it rather looks as if plans were made
to expand the supply of beds in the 1950s and of physicians in the
1960s (recalling that these are to a large degree policy variables in
Canada) in anticipation of insurance. The mere observation of
increased expenditure may be telling us more about supplier
behavior than about increased demand, and we cannot resolve the
issue without more detailed data.
TheResponse of the Hospital Industry—Administered
Inflation
Expenditureson general and allied special hospitals dominate
Canadian health spending. This sector is also the first to have been
covered by universal health insurance. The dramatic increase in
expenditures, from $280.4 million in 1953 to $2,594.6 million in
1971, or nearly 10 times, is the product of a combination of many
factors that may or may not be associated with insurance coverage.
It is thus of some interest to sort out the quantitative effects of
population growth, utilization, general price inflation, sectoral
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price inflation, and changes in service mix over this period. It is not
possible, owing to changes in the reporting procedures and reliabil-
ity of data, to present a detailed picture of what happened, but
several major trends are evident.
First of all, the 9.25 ratio of 1971 expenditures to 1953 is the
outcome of a 45.3 per cent increase in population and an increase
from $18.89 to $120.15 in expenditure per capita (Table 2).
Moreover, patient days per thousand population rose from 1,473.1
in 1953 to 1,896.6 in 1971, or 28.7 per cent. Thus the expenditure
per patient day implicit in these data increases from $12.82 to
$63.35, or by 9.3 per cent per year. The reported data are $12.47 and
$61.58 (Table 4; see also appendix), also yielding a 9.3 per cent
increase annually. The increase of 13.2 per cent annually in
hospital expenditure in Canada between 1953 and 1971 thus
resolves into increases of 2.1 per cent in population, 1.4 per cent in
patient day utilization, and 9.3 per cent in expenditure per patient
day.
This increase has, of course, several sources. Ideally, one would
like to trace out itsshifts through the full accounting detail
provided in present-day hospital statistics; but that would be a
major paper in itself and in any case could not be carried back to
1953 because the detail is missing. Certain clear trends, however,
emerge. In 1953 the cost per patient day of $12.47 was divided into
$7.20 gross wages and salaries, medical and surgical supplies,
drugs, and $4.23 other supplies and expense. By 1971 these
components were $41.82, $1.93, $1.78, and $16.06, or had increased
by 10.3 per cent, 7.7 per cent, 7.0 per cent, and 7.7 per cent
annually. Wages and salaries rose from 57.7 per cent of the hospital
budget to 67.9 per cent.22
The wage and salary component can be split into "price" and
"quantity" components (if we assume that hours are a homoge-
neous commodity) since in 1953 9.18 hours were worked per patient
day and in 1971 this figure had risen to 13.29 paid hours per patient
day. A difficulty is that in 1953, 1.62 hours per patient day were
worked by student nurses or interns who were then paid little or
nothing. If these are treated as part of hours worked in both years,
the increase in wages and salaries is madeof a 44.8 per cent
increase in hours worked and a 303.8 per cent increase in wages
and salaries per hour worked (from to $3.14 at an average of 8.1
per cent per year).
Comparing these shifts with general trends in the Canadian
economy, we find that over the period 1953—1971 the Consumer
Price Index rose 2.2 per cent annually, the G.N.E. deflator rose 2.5





per cent, and average weekly wages and salaries (industrial com-
posite) were up 5.0 per cent. Price indexes are not available for the
various components of hospital expenditure, now or in 1953, but if
we assumed that prices of hospital goods rosé more or less in line
with the rest of the economy, we would estimate quantity increases
of 5.4 per cent annually for medical and surgical supplies, 4.7 per
cent for drugs, 5.4 per cent for supplies and other expense, and
about 2.1 per cent annually for labor input. These figures should
not be taken too seriously, however, as no real price indexes exist.
Still, they suggest a tendency for real resource use in hospitals to
have increased fastest in supplies and drugs, less rapidly in labor
input. The single largest component of the cost increase is clearly
the change in levels of remuneration of hospital workers.
If we take the increase in average weekly wages of 139.2 per cent
and assume that because of changes in hours worked per week a
"true" hourly index might have increased 150 per cent, then
assuming that hospital workers had merely moved up in line with
workers generally, the wage bill in 1971 would have been $25.92
per patient day instead of $41.82. Out of expense per patient day of
$61.58 in 1971, $15.90, or 25.8 per cent, is attributable to the
increase in average hourly wages of hospital workers relative to all
other workers. This observation, of course, says nothing at alFabout
the division of this increase into differences in skill mix, "catch-up"
effects left over from the period of charity hospitals, or pure
inflation.
There are, of course, certain other effects that one can look for in
the longer-term data. One might expect that changes in the pattern
of the care episode, or in the mix of hospitals examined, might affect
these results. Yet in fact such shifts in the relation between patient.
day and care episode have not had much effect. Average lengths of
stay per separation and occupancy rates have both fluctuated
somewhat, but stays were 10.9 days in 1953, 11.3. in 1971, and
occupancy rates were 81.2 per cent and 81.3 per cent. Correspond-
ing to these sluggish movements, admissions per bed fell from 26.3
to 25.7. Thus changes in patient day costs are clearly not explicable
by changes in short-run capacity utilization.
Changes in hospital class of activity are a bit more complex.
General and allied special hospitals include chronic and convales-
cent, specialty, and teaching hospitals, all of which exhibit rela-
tively different activity patterns and cost experience. Chronic and
convalescent hospitals are too small a portion of the total for shifts
in their share to affect costs; for general (acute care) hospitals alone
costs per day rose from $12.79 to $65.58, or 9.5 per cent annually. It
is more difficult,]











































I 455 Insured I-s (industrial corn-
tavailablefor the
or in 1953, but if









of 139.2 per cent
per week a
per cent, then
up in line with
ave been $25.92
er patient day of
:ributable to the
ers relative to all
thing at all about
1 mix, "catch-up"
or pure














.e total for shifts
hospitals alone
annually. It
is more difficult, however, to sort out the effects on patient day costs
of growth in educational and outpatient expense since the de-
partmental distribution of reported expenditure in 1953 was still
relatively loose. Separate expenditures were reported for nursing
schools; outpatients, emergency, and social service; laboratory; and
radiology, the latter two departments having a significant propor-
tion of outpatient work. These groups accounted for 1.76 per cent,.
1.05 per cent, 2.49 per cent, and 3.34 per cent of total hospital
expenditure. The difficulty is that 17.44 per cent of total expendi-
ture is "unattributed" in 1953; if that component were equally
spread over all departments, the above percentages become 2.13
per cent, 1.27 per cent, 3.02 per cent, and 4.05 per cent.
By 1971 nursing education had increased to 3.41 per cent of total
budget, and total education was up to 6.48 per cent. If one assumed
that education costs other than nursing were zero in 1953, the
increase in direct educational costs per patient day would be from
to $3.99, or an increase of nearly 15 times. But in fact this is too
small a budget component to matter, patient day expense net of
education and special research projects is reported as $58.44 in
1971 compared with $12.20 expense net of nursing schools in 1953.
Even assuming medical education and research at zero in 1953, the
increase in expense net of education is 9-1 per cent annually. This
line of argument, however, ignores the high indirect costs as-
sociated with education. Thus one could be underestimating the
effects of expanding the educational sector.
In 1971, teaching hospitals of 500 beds or more had expenses per
patient day of $83.70 if full teaching and $67.56 if partial teaching,
whereas in 1953, all 500 +bed hospitals had costs per patient day of
$15.93. If we assume that 500-bed full-teaching hospitals in 1971
are roughly equivalent to 500 +bed hospitals in 1953, it appears that
costs have risen somewhat faster for this group—9.7 per cent
annually compared with 9.3 per cent. But the difference is not large
and is probably biased upward since not all 500 +bed hospitals are
full-teaching. Nor has there been any major shift in the numbers of
hospitals with full or partial teaching pthgrams, and the share of
such hospitals in total patient activity has not expanded signifi-
candy. Hence we may tentatively conclude that although educa-
tional programs are undoubtedly much more expensive to operate
than their direct costs would indicate, the increase in costs from
1953 to 1971 does not seem to be traceable to the expansion of
educational programs.
Turning to outpatient clinics (which include short stay patients or
day care surgery where relevant) we find that in 1971, outpatient
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fclinics, emergency, and social service account for $1.82 per patient 1961 that I
day. This compares with per patient day in 1953, confirming insurance
the widespread view that such activity has increased in importance downturn,
substantially faster than the regular inpatient service. These data through th
also show clearly, however, that quantitatively the effects of this What is f
increase are trivial. Even after due allowance is made for indirect have any o
costs and overheads associated with an outpatient department, it sions per ti
appears that this sort of activity, like education, does not affect the the
conclusions reached above, slowing do
The above discussion suggests that the reported increases in continue, b
expenditures per patient day really do reflect shifts in the cost of with insura
providing inpatient services, rather than being a result of shifts in bility. It se
the heterogeneous mix of hospital activities that are reflected in partially sti
"per diems." To relate these increases to changes in insurance in 1948. Th
coverage, we must examine the behavior of expenses by subpenods progressive
and draw on some additional data on wages and hours worked. For although it
this purpose we have divided the eighteen-year span into three More inf
equal subperiods: a pre-insurance phase 1953—1959, a "digestion" per day by
phase, 1959—1965, and a post-insurance phase, 1965—1971. The gross wage
initial period is not really pre-insurance, since several provincial follows:
plans were in operation during that period; but the two largest
provinces, Ontario and Quebec, began their plans in 1959 and 1961,
respectively, so that 1959 rather than 1958 may be treated as a Gross
transitional year. This is supported by the observation that cost per Salaries
day rose at an average rate of 7.2 per cent annually from 1953 to and Wages
1959 but only 5.8 per cent from 1958 to 1959. In 1960 it took off, to
12.9 per cent. 1953$ 7.20
In these three subperiods, costs per day rose at average rates of 1959 11.72
7.2 per cent, 9.2 per cent, and 11.6 per cent. Relative to the 196520.77
Consumer Price Index, these figures reduce to 5.6 per cent, 7.5 per 197141.82
cent, and 7.6 per cent. There is of course no particular rationale for
using the CPI as a deflator, except that no hospital price index
exists. This pattern suggests that the apparent cost surge after 1966 Relative
is in fact tied in with the general rate of inflation, but that a break in relative to
behavior did occur at the time national insurance was introduced, measures t
Hospital costs per day were rising substantially faster than general workers.
inflation rates prior to national health insurance, but their relative This tab
increase speeded up both during and after the period of introduc- over these
tion of the public plans. The fact that the share of personal income and salarie
going to hospitals increased much faster in the 1959-196 1 period earnings
than subsequently, in spite of the observations that both utilization inputs of h.
and (price-adjusted) costs per day increases are relatively similar down. In
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1961 that held down personal income growth. Whether national
insurance served to insulate the hospital sector against this
downturn, or whether hospital expenditures would have climbed
through the recession without public insurance, we do not know.
What is fairly clear from Table 4 is that national insurance did not
have any observable effect on utilization. Patient days and admis-
sions per thousand population rose almost twice as fast annually in
the pre-insurance period 1953—1959 and have generally been
slowing down since the public plans were introduced. Increases
continue, but are now less than 1 per cent per year. If not correlated
with insurance, utilization does move very closely with bed availa-
bility. It seems in fact to be responding to new bed construction,
partially stimulated by a federal building subsidy program started
in 1948. This program provided a fixed dollar grant per bed, so was
progressively eroded by inflation and finally terminated in 1970,
although it had some effect in the 1950s.
More information emerges if we look at the components of cost
per day by subperiods. The share of total expense accounted for by
gross wages and salaries, and its relation to hours worked, is as
follows:
Per Patient Day
Gross % of Relative
Salaries % TotalHours %Implicit % Wage
and WagesChangeBudgetWorkedChangeWageChangeGain %
1953$ 7.20 57.7 9.2 $0.78
1959 11.72 62.862.1 10.6 15.2 1.1142.3 11.4
1965 20.77 77.2 65.1 13.0 22.6 1.60 44.1 16.2
197141.82 101.367.9 13.3 2.2 3.1496.3 29.9
Relative wage gain is the percentage increase in hospital wages
relative to the average weekly wage (industrial composite); it
measures the improvement in the relative income status of hospital
workers.
This table suggests that there were some differences in behavior
over these subperiods. The share of hospital budget going to wages
and salaries has been rising but at a diminishing rate; the relative
earnings of hospital workers have grown at an accelerating rate; and
inputs of hours worked have first increased rapidly and then slowed
down. In fact, hours worked per patient day rose after 1965 and
then fell to its present level.
InsuredHealth Care in Canadar
Thissuggests a behavior pattern of a rapidly expanding hospital the implica
sector in the 1950s, perhaps driven by the new funds made apply the 1
available through private and provincial insurance plans. Hospital the rate of
workers were making income gains, labor inputs were rising, workers lea
federal funds were adding new beds, and physicians were generat- an industry
ing patients to fill them. Since the nonlabor budget share rose from cost-pass-th
$5.27 to $7.16 over this period, or 35.9 per cent, and prices tional insu
generally rose only 9.5 per cent, it would appear that nonlabor question; s
inputs rose even faster than labor inputs. But our lack of any sort of however, t
hospital nonlabor price index is a hindrance here. way of esta
During the introduction of national insurance, all cost increases ers must be
speeded up whereas utilization increases slowed down. Labor cost
input increased 22.6 per cent compared with 15.2 per cent in the It is, of c
previous six years; relative hospital workers' wages rose 16.2 per identified
cent faster than the general wage rate, and nonwage expense rose increase in
from $7.16 per day to $11.15, or 55.7 per cent, compared with of shifts in
general price increases of 9.7 per cent. It would appear that the respond to
initial impact of insurance was to increase substantially the real machines, 1
inputs to the hospital sector as well as to increase slightly the rate of nel. Thus
increase in hospital workers' income status. increase in
In the third phase, 1965—1971, increasing rates of cost increase change.
have begun to generate official concern and reaction. Utilrzation It turns
increases are slowing down still more and labor inputs per patient not
day are nearly static. Nonlabor inputs have risen from $11.15 to changes in
$19.76, or 77.2 per cent; relative to the general price level increase changing s
of 24 .2 per cent, this amounts to a 42.7 per cent increase (compared struction o
with 24.1 per cent, 1953—1959, and 41.9 per cent, 1959—1965), so it project in ii
may be that nonlabor inputs are still accelerating. But it may also be such as
that their prices have outstripped the CPI—we do not know. What However,
is most striking about the 1965-197 1 period is the dramatic increase problem.
in hospital workers' wages per paid hour—96.3 per cent, or 29.9 per First
cent faster than wages generally. This amounts to a rate of wage cedures an
status gain of 4.5 per cent annually, sustained for six years. On a and genen
base of $20.77, 29.9 per cent yields $6.21; or 10 per cent of total the backbo
hospital costs is attributable to the relative wage gains of hospital ticular clas
workers during the last six years. Over the whole span, if hospital shows tha
wages had just kept pace with industry generally, they would have (radiologis
risen to $1.87 per hour. psychologi
Of course, whether this is attributable to national health insur- cists, dieti
ance is another question. Relative wage gains did speed up during creased th
the period when insurance was being introduced but became much to 4.68 pe
more rapid in the later period. One could argue that this is a percentage
delayed effect of insurance—it took time for employees to absorb industry) b
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the implications of cost-pass-through and unionization for them to
apply the lesson. On the basis of this argument, insurance shifted
the rate of expansion of hospital costs to a new higher trend, and
workers learned to exploit this fact. But one could also argue that in
an industry with inelastic demand and growing private insurance,
cost-pass-through would have been discovered regardless of na-
tional insurance. Canadian experience alone cannot answer this
question; some U.S. comparisons might be helpful. It is clear,
however, that if future cost increases are to be moderated, some
way of establishing appropriate relative incomes for hospital work-
ers must be found. If they try to play catch-up with physicians, the
cost inflation is only beginning!
It is, of course, true that the above line of argument still has not
identified and pinned down the process of hospital expenditure
increase in a fully satisfactory manner; there exists the major issue
of shifts in labor force composition. It may well be that hospitals
respond to insurance, not just by adding more personnel and
machines, but by adding more complex and highly trained person-
nel. Thus the wage change series might include a significant
increase in human capital input rather than merely input price
change.
It turns out that this is a remarkably difficult proposition to test,
not because of conceptual problems, but because numerous
changes in reporting systems and a very detailed but constantly
changing specification of the hospital labor force make the recon-
struction of a set of consistent historical series a major research
project in itself. This project is beyond the bounds of a survey paper
such as this one. It cries out to be done as a federal research study.23
However, a bit of indirect evidence can be brought to bear on the
problem.
First of all, despite the attention given to complex diagnostic pro-
cedures and highly specialized forms of treatment, nursing services
and general support staff (dietary, laundry, administrative) are still
the backbone of the hospital. A series of longitudinal studies of par-
ticular classes of hospital manpower over period 1961—1968
shows that the professional and technical classes of employees
(radiologists, pathologists, radiology and laboratory technicians,
psychologists, social workers, medical record librarians, pharma-
cists, dietiticians, and physical and occupational therapists) in-
creased their share of total hospital employment from 3.44 per cent
to 4.68 per cent of total full-time employment in this field. The
percentage increase is large (36 per cent increase in an expanding
industry) but the absolute numbers are too small to affect total wage
459 Insured Health Care in Canadamovements. Their share in part-time employment also rose, from
I
risein patie
5.67 per cent to 6.32 per cent, but part-time employees are only ary pressure
about 10 per cent of the total. hours input
In the same period, full-time graduate nurses and nursing as- break.
sistants rose from 6.42 per cent and 19.00 per cent of total full-time A report r
employment to 8.90 per cent and 21.60 per cent, a smaller change tics Branch
(20 per cent) but a more significant quantitative shift. Thus, (Sources of
a picture emerges of a proportional increase in nursing and Canada, 191
nursing assistant staff and a corresponding reduction in relative firms this pi
employment of the unskilled "other" category. It is thus plausible see that fror
to argue that in fact the human capital input per hour worked did cent annual
rise somewhat over the period under consideration. rising 10.3
But this change, it turns out, does not appear to explain the wage outpatient
shift. The reason is that average wages for nursing personnel pattern of e,
generally (graduates and assistants) are not markedly different from tic mix may
those of other staff. In the first half of 1971, nurses on short-term Sources
units averaged $3.11 per hour and on long-term, $2.86 per hour. but unfortu
These made up 80 per cent of all nursing hours in public hospitals. expense is
By comparison, averages in general services were: administration medical an
$3.28, dietary $3.36, medical records $2.76, housekeeping $2.21, the labor c
plant operation and security $3.28, and laundry and linen $2.19. period 196:
Thus the pattern of wage differentials is simply not large enough to per cent an
explain a major shift in the average from a change of 10 per cent or three-quart
even 20 per cent. We may conclude that shifting personnel mix has one-quartel
had very little to do with the overall pattern of wage inflation, work per
Two other points deserve comment before leaving this issue. Part paid hour n
of the wage increase has clearly been attributable to the phasing out seven-eight
of the unpaid or almost unpaid workforce of student nurses. In shown to h
1953, student nurses, nursing assistants, and interns accounted for increaseiii
1.62out of 9.18 hours worked per patient day. Yet even if we pulled population
all of these out of the base for computing wage and salary cost in shifts in lab
1953, we divide wage and salary cost per patient day of $7.20 by shifts are d
7.56 to arrive at an average wage ofand an increase in average such shifts
wages from 1953 to 1971 of 232 per cent. Although substantially hour as a
below 304 per cent, this figure is also well above the approximately celerating,
140 per cent increase in general wage levels—on the maximum inflation in
possible allowance for the effects of eliminating unpaid or low-paid ever,
student labor. And of course student labor is not yet fully phased reported in
out. industry w
Finally, one should note that the elimination of student labor has This may b
been associated in the latter part of the period with the closing of education—
hospital nursing schools. Thus the relative constancy of hours per education




nt also rose, from
are only
s and nursing as-

















t large enough to
of 10 per cent or
ersonnel mix has
age inflation.
ng this issue. Part
to the phasing out
udent nurses. In
ms accounted for
even if we pulled
Lnd salary cost in








ith the closing of
ncy of hours per
and a continued
rise in patient care hours. The hospitals have responded to budget-
ary pressures by shedding functions; thus the experience of stable
hours input during this period may be only a temporary trend
break.
A report recently prepared by the Health Economics and Statis-
tics Branch of the Department of National Health and Welfare
(Sources of Increase in Budget Review Hospital Expenditures in
Canada, 1961 to 1971, Ottawa: December, 1973), essentially con-
firms this picture in the post-insurance period. From this report we
see that from 1961 to 1971 total hospital expenditures rose 13.7 per
cent annually, patient days rising 3.0 per cent and costs per day
rising 10.3 per cent. The authors of the report also conclude that
outpatient workload shifts were not large enough to affect the
pattern of expenditures and that morbidity shifts in patient diagnos-
tic mix may be important but cannot be identified.
Sources of expenditure increase are identified by department,
but unfortunately only expenditure on supplies and other nonlabor
expense is so allocated. Gross salaries and wages, drugs, and
medical and surgical supplies are each treated as aggregates. But
the labor cost per patient day is shown to have increased over the
period 1961—1971 substantially faster than the nonlabor cost (11.2
per cent annually against 8.5 per cebt) and to account for roughly
three-quarters of the increase in cost per patient day compared with
one-quarter for nonlabor cost. During this period, paid hours of
work per patient day rose 2.1 per cent annually and labor cost per
paid hour rose 8.7 per cent. Thus wage increase accounts for about
seven-eighths of labor cost increase per patient day. This source is
shown to have accounted for over 50 per cent of total expenditure
increase in budget-review hospitals, even including effects of
population growth and higher utilization. The possible effects of
shifts in labor force composition in this process are touched on, and
shifts are described in general terms, but the quantitative effects of
such shifts are unknown. The relative significance of labor cost per
hour as a source of expenditure increase over the period is ac-
celerating, but much of this can be accounted for by general
inflation in the economy. The rate of relative wage gain is, how-
ever, somewhat faster in the later period; hospital hourly wages as
reported in Sources of increase rose 8.1 per cent faster than general
industry wages, 1961—1965, and 21.3 per cent faster, 1965—1971.
This may be partly a result of the timing of the phase out of nursing
education—the impact of the shift away from hospital nursing
education and toward more medical education on hospital total
costs and average hourly wages has not yet been analyzed. In
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analyzing the response of hospital expenditure to insurance, how- PolicyRespo
ever,the message of the report parallels that of this paper—wage This subjec
inflation in the hospital sector is the main source of increase and the ment and b
timing does not particularly correspond to the extension of insur- hospital cos
ance, the expansion of utilization, or even the expansion of insurance-i]
employment. The most rapid relative wage increases have come in creases in
the late 1960s, when paid hours per patient day have been static creases in
and both population and utilization increase have slowed down. upgrading
Summing up, a picture seems to emerge of rapid increases in from emplo
hospital capacity and utilization as a precursor to national health The
insurance. During the pre-insurance period hospital inputs, wages, ful in prom
and costs were rising rapidly, and hospital wages also were As menti
moving up. Private insurance may have fed this process, but tal insurarn
government insurance was more likely a result of it. This would expenses ti
follow insofar as expenditure increases prior to the national plan appropriate
increased burdens on the uninsured and further restricted their encouragin
access. Moreover, provincial and private insurance plans came mobilize m
under increasing fiscal strain. Most of the discussion surrounding and to mai
the national hospital plan focused on its role as a vehicle for moving process of
more resources into the hospital sector (it worked!) and thus was a cost contro
response to increasing expenditure burdens. The initial insurance hospital ex
period saw a jump in hospital expenses, as hospitals appear th have resources
accelerated their expansion of paid hours per patient day. Hospital and reimb
wages rose at about the same rate as prior to insurance, although surrounde
their relative status improved faster. The picture does not suggest a years of dir
strong demand-induced wage inflation resulting from expanded The bud
employment. Finally, the very rapid expansion in hospital expendi- province,
tures in the mid-sixties triggered a bureaucratic response that has depending
been fairly successful in containing increases in labor inputs. But first decad
the problem of relative hospital wages continues unaffected, as line-item b
hospital employees seem to be improving their wage status at an a review ai
accelerating rate. In the absence of a detailed job breakdown in the based on ai
industry, of course, it is not possible to say whether they are still to forecast
"catching-up"; the industrial composite weekly wage of $137.64 in for distribL
1971 divided by 40 yields an "average" hourly wage of $3.44, independe
which is still above the hospital average of $3.14. But neither wage forecast, th
rate is skill adjusted or experience adjusted. In any case, it is clear there are s
that present bargaining and budget-setting procedures in hospitals may be ma
do not approximate a competitive market process! Thus it is far from aware of ti
clear that continuation or completion of catch-up would have any day, at teas
relevance to future trends. The problem of hospital wage determi- The pati
nation is still unresolved. year's exp
462
IEvans 463 Instinsurance, how-
this paper—wage
f increase and the
xtension of insur-
he expansion of














!) and thus was a
initial insurance
Is appear to have
ent day. Hospital
urance, although












case, it is clear
ures in hospitals




Policy Responses to Hospital Cost Inflation
Thissubject leads into the issues surrounding hospital reimburse-
ment and budgetary control. We have argued that the problems of
hospital cost inflation in Canada have little to do with utilization,
insurance-induced or otherwise, but rather a lot to do with in-
creases in earnings of hospital workers and secondarily with in-
creases in real resource use per patient day (whether "quality"
upgrading by managers, pressure for more hands to lighten the load
from employees, or demands for further services by physicians).
The process of budgetarycontrol has not been particularly success-
ful in promoting efficiency and/or containing costs.
As mentioned above, the initial intention of the Canadian hospi-
tal insurance system was to provide a method of paying whatever
expenses the hospital system generated. Insofar as a policy toward
appropriate levels of expenditure existed, it seemed to involve
encouraging increase; the point of a federal program was to
mobilize more resources, to lower financial barriers to utilization,
and to maintain or increase standards of care. Consequently, the
process of budget review did not initially emphasize efficiency or
cost control; and when it became apparent in the late 1960s that
hospital expenditures were taking an accelerating share of national
resources and that "something" should be done, neither the review
and reimbursement process nor the statistical framework that
surrounded it proved adequate for the task. After more than five
years of discussion and study, they still are not.
The budget review process varies in detail from province to
province, and in fact from year to year in a given province,
depending on the state of the provincial treasury. For most of the
first decade of insurance, provinces employed some variant of a
line-item budget approval prior to the budget year, combined with
a review and settlement at year's end.24 The prospective budget is
based on an expected patient day load, and the ratio of total budget
to forecast load creates a synthetic per diem that is used as a basis
for distributing the hospital's budget over the year but is not an
independent price in the sense that if actual load is above or below
forecast, the total budget will not be adjusted proportionately. If
there are significant deviations from forecast, partial adjustments
may be made at year's end. But both agency and hospital are well
aware of the difference between average and marginal costs per
day, at least in this context.25
The patient day forecast is generally based on the preceding
year's experience adjusted for any known special factors in or
463 Insured Health CareCanadaforecasts a outside each hospital. It tends to be quite accurate. It is not defined
in terms of diagnostic mix, although certain special subpopulations marginal
thumb are (such as renal dialysis cases) would be forecast separately. For each
hospital, expected procedure workloads and input requirements by With any c
for differer category are then developed from this forecast; the particular and this ha procedure forecasts thus implicitly embody some judgement about
diagnostic and severity mix based on the past experience of the appropriat
hospital. But the judgement never becomes explicit. Once physical proxies sw
requirements, personnel, supplies, and equipment by category are negotiatioi
approved, the final budget will then depend on negotiated wage each
financial a scales for the positions in each hospital's approved establishment.
Formally, these negotiations take place between hospital manage- given appr
province n ments (on a provincial basis) and provincial unions or associations. long as bu But since wage costs are usually passed directly to the provincial associated reimbursing agency, it is not entirely clear what besides public cases treat interest stiffens the negotiators for This may be one increment explanation for the unusually rapid wage increases in hospitals.
The review process has required provincial reimbursing agen- requests g
wage neg cies to accumulate a great deal of detailed information about each tioned abo hospital, much of it informal. In Ontario, the Hospital Services As the Commission appoints financial representatives, each responsible become rr for several hospitals, whose task is to work within the hospital as main the Commission's agent during the preparation of a budget but to in hospital act as the hospital's representative in steering the budget through substitutir the Commission. In B.C., the Hospital Insurance Service maintains the proble a budget "model" of each hospital (which is not revealed to that practice or
hospital!) which it uses in evaluating the annual submissions. Thus incomes o
the reimbursement process is very information-intensive. The "m The problem, however, is that none of this information is or- 1%9 Task ganized in a way linking expenditure with output. Neither hospital made of nor reimburser knows total costs of inpatient care in a given recomme r
hospital (except for hospitals with no outpatient or educational ing!) bette
activity) since all data is based on inputs. Direct laundry costs per ing inceni pound processed, or nursing ward costs per patient day, can be pondingly
calculated, but no allocation of overhead or indirect costs is earned reports as
out. If a hospital's diagnostic mix shifts, or if its patient day load trators
andIor length of stay changes, the reimbursing agency may know in budgets.
which direction the budget should shift, but never by how much. budgets a
Thus hospitals are exhorted to lower length of stay. They reply that share for
this would raise their per diem, and that the paying agency would bursemen
not approve all the necessary increase. The paying agency says that agerial ai it will approve the necessary increase, but no more. Yet no one reasons.
knows what is necessary. The same problem arises if patient day
464 Evans
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forecasts are over- or under-run; no one knows by how much a
marginal patient day costs less than average. Arbitrary rules of
thumb are used. Nor can comparisons across hospitals be made
with any confidence, because "similarity" embodies no adjustment
for differences in diagnostic mix. Everyone knows this is important;
and this has been shown analytically,27 but no one is sure what the
appropriate adjustment should be. Thus similarity is judged on
proxies such as size, location, or educational role.. The process of
negotiation and budget determination for the largest hospitals in
each province is one of the financial responsibilities of senior
financial and health officials in the provincial government and is
given appropriate attention and weight; but the data from which the
province might determine what it is buying simply do not exist. As
long as budgets are based on levels of inputs, and inputs cannot be
associated in any comprehensive way with outputs (in terms of
cases treated by type or students trained), budgeters fall back on
incrementalism (last year plus X per cent) and add in the special
requests generated by medical technology and the relatively loose
wage negotiation process. Hence the statistical outcomes men-
tioned above.
As the inability of budget review to limit cost escalation has
become more apparent, public poJicy has responded along two
main Efforts have been made to encourage greater efficiency
in hospitals and to reduce the size of the inpatient hospital sector by
substituting other forms of care. Both policies have tended to move
the problem out of the hospital sphere and into the realm of medical
practice organization; neither has come to grips with the ballooning
incomes of hospital workers.
The "management" orientation is reflected in Volume II of the
1969 Task Force Report dealing with hospital services. Much was
made of the poor management practices in hospitals, and the
recommendations covered the range of training (and even licenc-
ing!) better hospital managers, giving them more scope, and creat-
ing incentives for efficiency. Hospital reimbursement has cones-
pondingly moved toward global budgeting, using line-item input
reports as a guide to setting global amounts but giving adminis-
trators more discretion in allocating expenditures within total
budgets. Experiments have been tried with fixing annual target
budgets and allowing managers to share under-runs and use their
share for capital expansion or other projects—the incentive reim-
bursement approach. It seems fair to say, however, that the man-
agerial approach has been relatively unsuccessful for several
reasons.
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First,the limited possibilities of comparison across hospitals with care surgei
existing data make reliable identification of "good" and "bad" main probi
management impossible. Moreover, detailed analysis suggests that for utilizat
there is very little variance across hospitals in relative efficiency facilities a
within each province; the style of medical practice and the pattern home care
of reimbursement jointly determine most of hospital behavior.28 patients 01
Theadministrator may.not have much discretion. Even if one could Moreover,
identify desirable behavior and if the administrator had enough Canadian
control over style of care delivery to do what the reimburser provinces
desired, creation of incentives is almost impossible. Reimburse- Alberta,
ment incentives work only if a dollar of "profit" (shared cost A furthe
under-runs) is worth more to management than a dollar of opera- ment. Arni
tional expense. In a nonprofit industry whose capital expansion based in h
needs are met out of a separate budget on the basis of regional and care; and
political needs, thisis not so. Direct incentives to managers
themselves are likewise ruled out as long as hospitals are nominally nates a tw
controlled by independent boards of trustees—the careers of ad- the hospit
ministrators andlor their levels of remuneration are only indirectly received f
influenced by payment agencies. Rewarding efficiency by "promo- received
tion" to a larger hospital is not possible. And finally, everyone base shrin
knows that hospitals cannot be allowed to go bankrupt. The (legitimate
penalties for inadequate performance can never be absolute; at Reimbursi
worst one can fire the administrator. But this weakens any ability he inpatient
might have to run a tight ship even if he wanted to—the organiza- they are le
tion itself is never at risk. The focus on improved management has the probli
not been abandoned—it is still obviously true that better manage- the
ment can yield more health care for a given budget—but as a costs asso
technique for overall cost containment it is of less interest.29 episodes c
Attention thus shifts to ways of reducing hospital utilization—by of treatme
providing institutional alternatives such as convalescent care, day care woul
care surgery, home care; by shifting medical practice away from The uti
fee-for-service practice and toward salaried group practice or other traced to I
arrangements; or by simply closing beds. All of these efforts are exists that
currently underway; and although it is too early to make any final less hospi
judgement about their success, certain patterns have become sector.32 T
apparent. study gror
The institutional alternatives approach has the advantage of communit
being supported by medical as well as economic opinion; the parallellin
deleterious effects of excessive hospitalization on the patient are there is g
well recognized and are often more important than economic provincial
objectives in initiating new programs. Particularly in the pediatric organized
area, it has been demonstrated that significant medical improve- present sy
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care surgery units or ambulatory medical treatment facilities.30 The
main problems with this approach are twofold. First, the tendency
for utilization to rise to match supply ensures that unless new
facilities are balanced by withdrawal of old, total costs rise. If a
home care program or convalescent beds move less severely ill
patients out of acute hospitals, new acute care patients flow in.
Moreover, discharge from lower intensity facilities is more difficult.
Canadian experience parallels Feldstein's judgement in the U.S.;3'
provinces with well-developed convalescent care systems, like
Alberta, have relatively higher hospital costs per capita.
A further problem arises because of the structure of reimburse-
ment. Ambulatory alternatives to inpatient care have tended to be
based in hospitals. But hospitals' budgets are geared to inpatient
care; and administrators tend to view reduced days of care as
threatening reimbursements. Thus a day surgery unit that elimi-
nates a two-day stay minor surgery case is perceived as "costing"
the hospital two per diems. The unit price or reimbursement
received for an ambulatory case is less than would have been
received for a corresponding inpatient. As the hospital's inpatient
base shrinks, and its ambulatory load expands, it must negotiate
(legitimately) ever higher per diems, and this is not easy to do.
Reimbursing agencies see the prohiem differently. They see total
inpatient utilization failing to fall as ambulatory care expands and
they are less willing to negotiate higher rates. The crucial aspects of
the problem are the responsiveness of utilization to facilities and
the inability of either agency or hospital to quantify the full unit
costs associated with either inpatient or ambulatory episodes. If
episodes could be accurately priced and reimbursed independently
of treatment mode, the process of moving patients out of inpatient
care would be strongly encouraged.
The utilization response, in Canada as in the U.S., has been
traced to the mode of organization of medical practice. Evidence
exists that physician groups paid on a salary basis use substantially
less hospital care for their patients than does the fee-for-service
sector.32 This has led numerous observers and some government
study groups to recommend reorganization of medical practice into
community health centers (now a very elastic term with features
parallelling HMO's) as ways of moderating hospital costs.33 But
there is general agreement that this is a long, slow process. Several
provincial governments are committed to the idea in principle, but
organized medicine is strongly opposed to modification of the
present system.
As for the most simple-minded approach, closing beds, this has
467 Insured Health Care in CanadaI
beenadopted as official or unofficial policy in several provinces. TABLE5P1'
"Standards" of numbers of "needed" acute care beds per thousand , of
population, which never were based on anything very much, are
being revised downward; and provincial governments are mount-
ing increased resistance to providing capital for new hospitals or B.C.
hospital expansion. This tactic is of course easiest in provinces with
rapidly growing populations such as Ontario and B.C., but actual 1957 1.25
closure of hospitals is politically extremely difficult. (The first
province to adopt bed limitation as an official tactic was, however, 1960 148 Quebec, after the Castonguay Report stated that at least a third of 1961 152
the province's beds were unnecessary.) This approach probably 1962 1.48
holds the greatest promise of cost moderation in the near term, 1963 1.43
whereas long-run efforts at control will probably depend on reor- 1964 1.49
ganization of medical practice and some improved method of 1965 1.44




MedicalInsurance and Medical Expenditures—Cause 1970 1.73
orEffect 1971 1.67
The question of reorganizing medical practice leads directly into % Change
consideration of the impact of Medicare on service supply. Sjatisti- 19574964 19.2
cal evaluation of this impact is hampered by the fact that the 19641971 12.1
program is so recent, 1971 being the first full year of national 1957—1971 33.6
coverage for which complete data are available. Moreover, in each NOTE:Data of enti
of the provinces private nonprofit plans pre-dated the public
program and provided a significant degree of insurance coverage.34
The introduction of insurance is not a clear-cut, point-in-time income r
phenomenon. increase
Table 5 shows, however, that when data are examined at the been
provincial level the timing of the public plans is quite apparent. Why ti
The proportion, of personal income in each province spent on course, th
physicians' services takes an abrupt jump away from its previous demand,
pattern in each province either in the year the public plan was suppliers.
introduced (underlined) or immediately after. The Saskatchewan tracing ti
picture is of course muddled by the physician strike of 1962 and its physician
aftermath and Alberta physicians seem to show a degree of anticipa- . Table6 c
tion, but elsewhere the change is very systematic. Whether this is a the index
new plateau share of personal income or a new upward trend is too by the
soon to tell (total Canadian personal income was up 10.4 per cent in 1963 and
1971, so the apparent leveling off of the "physician share" may be expenditi
exogenous). But it is clear that in each province public insurance same bas
was associated with significant increases in the share of personal available.
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TABLE 5 Physician Expenditures as a Percentage
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income received by physicians. (Table 5 also shows that this
increase was superimposed on a general uptrend which may have
been leveling off in the mid-sixties.)
Why this was so is less clear. In conventional economics, of
course, the answer is obvious—lower prices to consumers, greater
demand, greaterutilization,and higher prices charged by
suppliers. And undoubtedly some of these changes occurred. But
tracing them down is not all that easy. First of all, list prices of
physician services did not particularly respond to public insurance.
Table 6 contains provincial fee schedule indexes (after Medicare
the index reports benefits paid by the provincial agency) compiled
by the Department of National Health and Welfare since December
1963 and compares these indexes with total expenditure and total
expenditure per Expenditure data are standardized to the
same base as prices in 1964; no average fee level for 1963 is
available. This table shows, first, that both total expenditure and















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































total expenditure per capita rose steadily yearby year in each
province whether or not list fees rose. Fee increases accelerated the
process; their absence did not inhibit it. Of course, much of this is
attributable to improving collections ratios over the period, and
probably also greater adherence to fee schedules. But this pattern
of behavior persists after Medicare is introduced. The mechanism
that drives expenditure clearly does not operate through listed fees
alone (or even primarily), and since listed fees are now pegged to
actual fees it does not seem to operate through actual fees either.
Unfortunately we have no data at all to adjust collections ratios and
approximate actual fee movements prior to Medicare.
In Table 7 the same point emerges at the aggregate level. Here
the nine-province fee benefit index (weighted by 1964 provincial
populations) has been linked to the Consumer Price Index Medical
Care Component for earlier years. It shows physicians' fees rising
at about the same rate as all prices from 1957 to 1971, faster than the
general price level before Medicare, but substantially slower since.
Recalling that actual prices probably moved faster than list in the
pre-Medicare years, but not since, it follows that relative price
increases in the medical care industry have slowed down since
insurance went into effect. Yet expenditures go on climbing. If list
prices really reflected actual prices over this period, one .could
derive an apparent quantity increase for 1957—1971 by dividing
expenditure change by price change—this "quantity" estimate
increases by 8.0 per cent per year. Adjusting for population change
brings this rate down to 5.9 per cent per year, still a very healthy
rate of "real" service input.36
These rapid increases in expenditure, whether "quantity" or
hidden price change, should show up either as increases in average
gross receipts per physician or as increases in the number of
physicians available per capita. These data are displayed in tables 8
and 9. As pointed out in the appendix, they apply to fee-practice
physicians only; although this represents oniy about two-thirds of
the total physician stock, the remainder are not included in physi-
cian expenditure data and neither set nor collect fees. The increase
of 28.7 per cent in physician stock per capita combines with an
increase of 173.1 per cent in gross receipts per physician to yield an
increase of 251.5 per cent in physician expenditures per capita, and
a 29.9 per cent increase in population yields the 350 per cent
increase in physician expenditures of Table 7•37 Annualizing, popu-
lation rose 1.9 per cent per year; physicians per capita, 1.8 per cent,
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TABLE 7Physician "Price" Movements in Canada, 1957-1973
















1957 89.5 94.4 70.0 78.2 85.9
1958 94.4 96.8 77.6 82.2 87.8
1959 97.1 97.9 83.9 86.4 90.1
1960 98.4 99.1 91.4 92.9 94.8
1961 100,0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1962 103.0 101.2 104.6 101.6 99.7
1963 104.9 102.9 116.8 111.3 107.2
1964 107.1 104.8 127.6 119.1 112.6
1965 110.3 107.4 140.4 127.3 118.2
1966 112.2 111.4 155.9 138.9 126.6
1967 121.4 115.3 176.7 145.6 130.3
1968 127.9 120.1 203.0 158.7 139.8
1969 134.8 125.5 232.1 172.2 149.5
1970 137.0 129.7 265.0 193.4 165.6
1971 139.6 133.4 318.4 228.0 192.8
1972 142.3 139.8
1973 145.7 150.4 '
% Change
1957—1971 354.9% 191.6% 124.4%
1957—1973 62.8% 59.3%
Per annum 3.1% 3.0% 11.4% 8.0% 5.9%
'Average value of the C.P.I. physicians' fees component, 1957—1964, linked in 1965 to the N.H.W.
Fee Benefit Index (Table 6).
Expenditure on physician services (Table 1), indexed on 1961 =100.
Physician services expenditure ÷ list price.
Several interesting points emerge from these data. First of all, the
rise in physician stock has been twice as rapid as that of the
population, and has been accelerating. The introduction of Medi-
care coincides with a significant increase in the rate of additions to
the physician stock. Furthermore, gross receipts per physician have
gone ahead much more rapidly than list prices. If one accepted the
Table 7 list price increase of 56.0 per cent from 1957 to 1971, the
implicit average increase in real output per physician would be 4.1
per cent per year. Yet physician practices are not adding new inputs
rapidly; physician practice expenses rose at 5.8 per cent per year
from 1957 to 1971 compared with general price level increases of










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.3.2 per cent and wage increases of 5.2 per cent. Physician net drove uncc
incomes rose steadily relative to the average weekly wage, as driving up
shown in the last column of Table 8. What is striking is that average in physicia
earnings of physicians relative to this industrial composite rose This
faster in the period 1957—1964 than in the Medicare period 1964— data, each
1971. The difference is not great, but it is enough to suggest that the to medical
introduction of Medicare did not bring about a change in the pointed ot
longer-run forces that drive the relative incomes of physicians. rapidly in
Thus we are left with the observations that Medicare was period,
associated with rapid increases in the numbers of physicians and have move
rates of expenditure on their services, but not with major changes in accelerate
physician list prices. Physician relative income continued to climb do not mo
rapidly, but no faster than before Medicare; actual prices and real tended to 1
outputs per physician are unknown. We have, however, some by insuran
fragmentary data on real outputs. The before-and-after Medicare increase in
study of physician utilization in Montreal reports that aggregate three year
visit rates did not rise in response to insurance and that physician would it m
hours of work did not increase. Instead, physicians reorganized in the priv
their practice patterns and generated more income from a given There is si
number of initial patient contacts.38 This is supported by data from absolute ni
Trans-Canada Medical Plans showing that in insured populations, feet on rela
rates of physician-generated services per capita tend to rise faster push dowr
over time and to be more closely associated with physician availa- not worth
bility than are rates of patient-generated services.39 Aggregate data insurance
from Quebec for 1971 and 1972, the first two years of insurance, bers and af
show the same phenomenon, incredible quarter-to-quarter rates of Had Medi
increase of certain specific physician-generated services as well as market
a shift across fee schedule items from, for example, "ordinary" to generated
"complete" office examinations.40 individual
Rather than a linkage from demand through price and quantity to shifting ac
physician expense driven by independent shifts in demand, we list prices
seem to be observing a linkage from supply of physicians through rapidly wil
quantity of services as determined by the physician to total ex- influence
pense. What we observe, and what generates expense, is not however,
demand in the economist's sense but utilization, and utilization is absorb the
the outcome of patient demand and physician behavior. This trend. Of
behavior is at least partially dependent on the relation between post-Medi
desired and actual physician incomes. The role of national health seded
insurance may simply have been to relax further any market Table 1
constraints on how physicians manipulate utilization to generate role of ph
income. Table 8 suggests, however, that these constraints were not provinces
very significant before Medicare. Undoubtedly there was also a to be high
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drove uncollectables to zero in one year, but the primary force
driving up physician expenditures in the late 1960s is the increase
in physician stock and the changes in physician practice patterns.
This creates a rather puzzling inconsistency. In the time series
data, each province shows a clear jump in share of income devoted
to medical services when public insurance is introduced; and as
pointed out above, in most provinces physician incomes rose
rapidly in the years spanning the introduction. Yet over the longer
period, physician incomes relative to wages and salaries generally
have moved up about 3 per cent per year, and this increase did not
accelerate in the 1968—1971 period. Of course, wages and salaries
do not move with personal income; over this period they have
tended to lag behind. But the key question is the difference made
by insurance. In the absence of the public plan, would the rapid
increase in physicians per capita from 1968 to 1971 (14,2 per cent in
three years) have driven down average physician incomes? Or
would it merely have given rise to price and quantity adjustments
in the private market that would have pushed up costs anyway?
There is some evidence cross-sectionally in Canada that although
absolute numbers of physicians per capita have little systematic ef-
fect on relative physician income, rapid rates of growth of the stock
push down relative incomes (Evans, 1972, Ch. 3). The evidence is
not worth much, but we might tentatively suggest that national
insurance speeded up physician reactions to an increase in num-
bers and affected the timing of their income-maintaining responses.
Had Medicare not been introduced, the influx of physicians to the
market might have held down income increases in the short run and
generated pressure for increases in list prices and changes in
individual billing practices. Medicare speeded up the process by
shifting actual prices relative to list (hence the slower movement of
list prices post-Medicare) and by enabling billing practices to shift
rapidly without patient backlash (the Enterline findings). Physician
influence over the private market seemed to be strong enough,
however, that over the long haul they would have able to
absorb the influx and restore their incomes to the long-term upward
trend. Of course, thisisall hypothetical; we have very little
post-Medicare data yet and political variables have now super-
seded whatever market forces were previously operative.4'
Table 10 merely provides some corroborative evidence on the
role of physician pricing behavior. It shows the variation across
provinces in fee levels: B.C., Manitoba, Alberta, and Ontario tend
to be high priced whereas the eastern provinces are lower. Highest
of all is B.C. Yet these are also the provinces with the largest













































TABLE 10 Relative "Prices" of Medical Services across




All Services —All Services—
Fee Fee Benefits Benefits Paid
Schedule Schedule Paid All Visits
(Sept. 1) (Sept. 1) (Oct. 1) Servicesb Only
General Practitioners
B.C. 110.9 106.5 — 106.5 117.25 122.19
Alta. 99.4 106.6 113.2 115.53 121.28
Sask. 104.7 95.2 89.9 92.25 95.14
Man. 127.3 115.5 109.1 103.95 103.30
Ont. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.00 100.00
Que.a — — 92.72
NB. 98.3 97.9 92.5 — 86.07
N.S. 110.2 99.1 93.6 — 96.38
P.E.I. 98.7 89.0 98.9 — 85.66
Nfld. 96.6 86.8 86.8 — 85.65
Specialists
B.C. 108.9 112.7 112.7 103.64 124.20
Alta. 99.9 99.0 97.4 101.75 104.31
Sask. 103.4 95.4 90.1 87.44 90.34
Man. 112.9 106.1 100.2 92.05 93.02
Ont. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.00 100.00
Que. 108.1 101.2 101.2 — 91.80
N.B. 95.6 101.4 95.8 — 89.38
N.S. 109.5 101.9 96.2 — 98.14
P.E.I. 104.9 96.5 107.2 — 101.78
Nfld. 100.0 94.1 94.1 — 91.90
All Physicians
B.C. 109.6 110.8 110.8 110.33 122.84
Alta. 99.7 102.1 103.4 108.53 115.78
Sask. 103.9 95.3 90.0 89.80 93.58
Man. 118.6 108.7 102.7 97.90 99.96
Ont. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.00 100.00
Que.a — — — 92.42
N.B. 96.2 98.7 93.2 — 87.15
N.S. 109.9 99.2 93.7 — 96.95
P.E.I. 99.8 92.0 102.2 — 90.88
Nfld. 97.8 89.2 89.2 — 87.67
'Quebec general practitionershadno fee schedule in 1968 or1969.
Payments for laboratory services in eastern provinces are not on a unit basis.
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4791Inses across numberof physicians per capita. B.C. is the most prominent
=100) example—always at or near the top of all provinces in prices, yet far
ahead of the others in numbers of physicians (Table 9) and near
Afi bottom in physician incomes (Table 8). The inference is that as
—ervices— increases in physician stock spread the patient load more thinly.
Benefits Paid incomes per physician fall. The response is to try to drive up prices
All Visits andlor togenerate more output. Neither tactic has been fully
vlcesb Only successfulin B.C., but then the physician stock is abnormally large
there and probably includes a relatively larger number of semi-
retired practitioners.42
7.25 122.19 If in fact physician behavior is the key to utilization and expendi-
5.53 121.28 ture behavior, as Canadian insurance experience suggests,43 it
2.25 95.14 follows that efforts to modify patterns of expenditure by incentives
'3.95 103.30 directed at the consumer of care cannot hope to influence overall
p0.00 100.00 cost trends. Copayment is pretty much a dead issue in Canada, both
— 92.72 because of its distributional effects and because it cannot come to
86.07 grips with the real problems.44 Public policy has instead been
8566 directed at two approaches—control within the existing structure of
— 8565 medical practice, and modification of that structure.
Control in the existing structure includes negotiation of list fees
and could be extended to unilateral determination of such fees by
'364 124 20 government (although this has notbeen suggested out loud). The
1.75 10431 evidence now seems fairly clear that this will not work because
7.44 90:34 billings can be expanded almost indefinitely on a given schedule.
2.05 93.02 Moreover, procedural multiplication can be harmful to the patient's
0.00 ioo.oo health and can generate substantial external costs in the hospital
— 91.80 sector and elsewhere. The "provider profiles" mentioned above
— 89.38 merely identify very unusual practitioners; they give no leverage to
— 98.14 government over changes in general practice standards overtime. A
— 101.78 variety of gimmicks have been suggested or tried—absolute limits
— 91.90 on physician earnings (Newfoundland) merely lead to more physi-
cian leisure. Prorationing of billings against a fixed pooi of reim-
bursement has been suggested as a short-run measure, but in the
0,33 122.84 long run it seems to accentuate the pressures on physicians to
8.53 115.78 multiply procedures by penalizing the "non-multipliers" for the
790
93.58 excesses of their So far the only sure-fire method of
).00 cost containment appears to be the current suggestion by the
— 9242 Council of Health Ministers that physician immigration be re-
— 87:15 stricted. Fewer doctors, like fewer hospital beds, surely does mean
— 96.95 lower costs. Combined with "physician-extender" programs, it may
— 90.88 not mean fewer services. Thus the escalation of medical costs could
— 87.67 be limited to that generated by the income aspirations of current
physicians and future Canadian graduates.
Income aspirations of physicians seem to be somewhat muted at
479 Insured Health Care in Canada jpresent, partly because of large gains in the 1960s, but also because Department
the last, five years have seen an outpouring of public and private Canada. Th
opinion that "something" should be done about the private prac- covers all h
tice, fee-for-service mode of medical care delivery. Just as this form medical an
of medical care delivery seems to make rationalization of hospital budgets, pa
use almost impossible, so it stands in the way of achieving limita- scription dt
tions on medical costs. The root of the problem is that although tional expei
fee-for-service creates incentives for unnecessary care, private
practice blocks any information channel that would enable a hospital bu
regulatory agency to determine necessity (or even the accuracy of operating C
thebilling). The best that can be done is to identify "unusual" The pers
patient or provider patterns. As much as 50, or 90, per cent of tures that a
tonsillectomies may be unnecessary, but which ones? And who has ment," suc'
authority or ability to decide? Thus, attempts to achieve public services of
accountability for medical care delivery fail before the enormous cians and
information advantage possessed by the physician, exactly the same nursing ho
problem that made the private market useless as a regulatory cluded) be
device. administrat
The recommended solution in Canada is some form of public provincial
organization, owning facilities and hiring physicians, tied into a patients an
much more complete network of patient information. The label patients. T'
attached is usually "Community Health Center," aithouSh the Annual]
name means something different to almost everyone using it. The irregularly,
primary features of the C.H.C. are, however, that it combines and Welfa
conventional medical practice with a more general social and 1960—1971,
public health concern, that it is not dependent on fee for service, are from
and that unlike a medical practice it is nonprofit. It is also quite far Expenditui
down the road as a system of medical care delivery, and the road Health Ca
itself is far from clear. Nevertheless, almost every group that has 1960 and e
studied the Canadian health insurance system agrees that we National L
cannot stay where we are. Insurance changes only the demand side Canadian 1
of health care—the supply side is crucial. The hardest part of the drug series
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Department of National Health and Welfare, Government of
Canada. Their personal health care concept, generally speaking,
covers all health care expenditures that are, or prior to the public
medical and hospital plans were, made by persons from family
budgets, payments to hospitals, physicians, dentists, and for pre-
scription drugs. It excludes public health, research, and educa-
tional expenditures on health care, but does include governmental
expenditures on special-category hospitals. Research charged to a
hospital budget is included in PHC, which also includes hospital
operating costs but not capital expenditures.
The personal health care concept also excludes health expendi-
tures that are not directed by the health care provider "establish-
ment," such as nonprescription drugs, eyeglasses and appliances,
services of health professionals outside hospitals other than physi-
cians and dentists, and nursing home care. The line between
nursing homes (excluded) and private convalescent hospitals (in-
cluded) becomes a little fuzzy but is drawn on the basis of
administrative arrangements. Private hospitals contracting with the
provincial agency and providing insured care for all or part of their
patients are included with respect to their expenditure on insured
patients. The amounts involved are trivial.
Annual PHC data for Canada the provinces are published
irregularly, the latest being Canada, Department of National Health
and Welfare, Expenditure on Personal Health Care in Canada,
1960—1971, Ottawa, n.d. This is the basis for Table 1; pre-1960 data
are from Canada, Department of National Health and Welfare,
Expenditures on Personal Health Care in Canada, 1953—1961,
Health Care Series Memorandum #16, Ottawa, March 1963. In
1960 and earlier, expenditure in hospitals run by the Department of
National Defense (like private hospitals, a very small part of the
Canadian hospital industry) are excluded. The earlier prescription
drug series also fails to include prescribed drugs sold outside retail
pharmacies. The inclusive series can be pushed back to 1957 by
earlier "occasional memoranda" from Health and Welfare but the
series breaks there.
A more inclusive definition of the health care industry is the basis
for a new data series, recently released as Canada, Department of
National Health and Welfare, National Health Expenditures in
Canada, 1960—1971, Ottawa, October 1973 (including comparative
U.S. data). It adds to PHC nursing home care, nonprescription
drugs, eyeglasses and other appliances, services of other health
professionals outside institutions, costs of prepayment administra-
tion, voluntary organizations, research, new-facility construction,
481 Insured Health Care in Canadaand public health activity. Some specific exclusions are made (such but this mc!
as government of Canada hospital facility construction) but these etc. This soi
are quantitatively trivial. This comprehensive series indicates that merely refe]
total health expenditures per capita in Canada rose from $113.50 in federal pub!
1960 to $306.11 in 1971, compared with $80.53 and $236.61 for same figure
PHC. Thus the PHC percentage has risen from 71.0 per cent to 77.3 Health and
per cent, indicating the faster growth of the hospital and physician tems, Ltd.
sectors. which maini
Data on the physician stock and physician incomes are generated suppliers. '1
along with the health care expenditure series and are reported in 32,625 into
Canada, Department of National Health and Welfare, Earnings of "not in priv]
Physicians in Canada, 1961—1971, Health Care Series #30, Ottawa, breakdown
n.d. Earlier data are from Earnings of Physicians in Canada than the 21,
1957—1965, Health Care Series #21, Ottawa, April 1967. This series Earnings of
covers "active fee practice" physicians, those "whose main titioners are
employment is in the provision of personal medical care services" Moreover, i
and "whose professional income is mainly in the form of fees for employed i:
services rendered." It thus excludes all salaried physicians provid- Ofl the
ing medical care, whether in a private group practice, on a hospital for example
staff, or in public service. In fact, however, prior to 1970 a small Physicians).
number of salaried physicians working in group practices were the manpov
included; only those in Manitoba and Newfoundland where Market forl
salaried service was quantitatively important were excluded. In especially (
1970 all salaried group practitioners were excluded, so that the The activ
reported increase in manpower in 1971 over 1970 is remarkably for analyzi
low. In this paper we have added back-salaried physicians outside receives th1
Manitoba and Newfoundland for 1970 and 1971 to keep the series the Medica
consistent. Bracketed figures in the text tables show the effects of and reporte
adding back-salaried practitioners in those two provinces as well, part-time pI
As a measure of the availability of physician services, the fee Part way th
practice physician is somewhat unsatisfactory. To compare, for the physicU
example, service availability in Newfoundland with the national in 1971 thi
average by looking at fee practitioners only is grossly inaccurate, netting
Similarly, it appears that some of the discrepancy between Quebec average gr
and Ontario in physicians per capita is made up by larger teaching $42,624 COl
programs in Quebec with more hospital staff, interns, and residents physicians.
supplying medical services but appearing in hospital budgets. earnings of
(Quebec, Commission d'enquète sur la sante et le bien-être social, tunately, a
Analyse comparative des de l'hospitalisation au Québec et would movi
en Ontario, Annexe I du rapport, Gouvernement de Québec, also problei
September 1967.) Total active civilian physicians in Canada in 1971 result of di
are reported as 32,625 (Canada, Department of National Health and and the mv
Welfare, Health Manpower Inventory, 1972, Ottawa, October 1972) is almost c
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but this includes administration, teaching, part-time practitioners,
etc. This source, which also includes stock estimates back to 1963,
merely references the Canadian Medical Directory, but another
federal publication, Health Services in Canada, 1973, produces the
same figure and refers to it as prepared by the Ministry of National
Health and Welfare, based on data from Medical Marketing Sys-
tems, Ltd. (Seccombe House, formerly Canadian Mailings Ltd.),
which maintain records for the drug detail men and other medical
suppliers. The Health Manpower Inventory divides this total of
32,625 into 12,566 general practitioners, 13,616 specialists, 1,257
"not in private practice," and 5,186 interns and residents. Yet this
breakdown implies 26,182 active practitioners, or 20 per cent more
than the 21,895 active fee-practice physicians in 1971 reported in
Earnings of Physicians (see above) when all reporting salaried prac-
titioners are added in. No "reconciliation statement" is prepared.
Moreover, no documentation is provided about the methodology
employed in the tabulation, so the primary official source of data
on the physician stock is effectively undocumented (in contrast,
for example, to the detailed methodology available in Earnings of
Physicians). For further discussion of alternative estimates prior to
the manpower inventory, see R. C. Evans, Price Formation in the
Market forPhysician Services in Canada, 1957—1969, Ottawa, 1973,
especially Chapter III and Appendix 111-3.
The active fee-practice series is, however, preferable as a basis
for analyzing market behavior since this group sets fees and
receives them and is the provider of almost all insured care under
the Medicare plan. The income series associated with this group
and reported in the text has certain problems as well. It includes
part-time physicians who are semi-retired, or who entered practice
part way through the year. This is partly corrected by focusing on
the physicians with net incomes above some arbitrary minimum—
in 1971 this minimum is $15,000. Any self-employed practitioner
netting less than $15,000 cannot be fully employed! In 1971
average gross and net incomes for this group were $61,516 and
$42,624 compared with $56,824 and $39,203 for all fee-practice
physicians. Thus, $42,624 would be a better estimate of the net
earnings of a "representative" fully employed practitioner. Unfor-
tunately, a time series of this sort is not very meaningful since it
would move with the (arbitrary) choice of full-time cutoff. There are
also problems in the gross income and expenses of practice data as a
result of disentangling group practices with salaried physicians;
and the investment earnings component of nonprofessional income
is almost certainly understated since all data are drawn from tax
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returnsthat do not include capital gains prior to 1972. Physicians month, year,
tend to invest in assets (such as medical arts buildings) yielding schedule fro
high capital gain but low income, and it is hard to believe that the 1970, howev
average physician in fee practice earned only $798 from all nonfee practitioners
sources in 1971, including incidental wages and salaries, given benefit sche
one's fragmentary knowledge of physician-owned real estate hold- provinces. A
ing companies! Some of this may be picked up in 1972 and after, as then be den
half of capital gain must now be reported as income (when real- changes in I
ized). The same sort of problem arises with expenses of practice, listed fees a
some of which of course reemerge as investment income. Still, it is comparison
doubiful if these factors influence trends over time to any great receipts.
degree. The prim
The physician price series for earlier years is the Consumer Price Statistics vo
Index, physicians' fees component, prepared by the Dominion Statistics. H
Bureau of Statistics and reported in Canada, Department of Na- new and mo
tional Health and Welfare, Research and Statistics Memo, Health reports
Care Price Movements, Ottawa, April 1968. The overall CPI is from content of t
Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Canadian Statistical Re- volume of c
view: Historical Summary 1970, Ottawa, August 1972. Updating of volumes are
statistics in this issue was from the February 1974 issue of the culosis Hos
Canadian Statistical Review (monthly). All population data (June manpower
1st annual data) and average weekly and hourly wage are In
drawn from these sources. mind. First
The CPI index was relatively limited—fees for office visits, home D.B.S. data
visits, an obstetrical confinement, and an appendectomy as re- the same de
ported by six general practitioners in each metropolitan area to a expenditure
semi-annual telephone survey. It was phased out city by city as private hos:
Medicare spread across the provinces. The Department of National agency. Th
Health and Welfare also prepares an index of provincial fee numbers in
schedules, starting in December 1963. In earlier years this index beds in the
might differ substantially from fees charged to uninsured patients. Vol. I—Host
As each province entered Medicare, this index was shifted from a pp. 46—50.
listed-fees to a benefits-paid basis (since many provinces pay less chronic, coi
than 100 per cent of the schedule or impose administrative limita- days per ti
tions). data are unpublished but were generously supplied ported aver
by the Health Economics and Statistics Division, Health Programs by 365 (or
Branch, National Health and Welfare. A compound index was per thousan
constructed using the CPI index to 1964, the N.H.W. fee schedule admissions
index to 1968 or whenever each province entered Medicare, and reported m
the N.H.W. benefits paid index thereafter. The 1965 overlap bly because
between CPI and N.H.W. was used to link these two series (the cally outrai
CPI is Laspeyres, the N.H.W. Paasche) and the second point of This ma
linkage was implicit in the N.H.W. procedure that reports only arithmetic
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month, year, .and size of percentage increase in fee or benefit
schedule from December 1963 to the .present by province. Until
1970, however, when Quebec entered Medicare, Quebec general
practitioners had no fee schedule. Thus the Canadian average fee
benefit schedule (FB) is a weighted average of the nine other
provinces. An index of total expenditure on physicians' services can
then be derived from the personal health care data and compared to
changes in listed prices or benefits to indicate the extent to which
listed fees account for changes in total expenditure. A similar sort of
comparison can be made between list prices and physician gross
receipts.
The primary source of hospital data is the set of Hospital
Statistics volumes published annually by the Dominion Bureau of
Statistics. Hospital reporting by D.B.S. began in 1932 but in 1952 a
new and more extensive reporting system was introduced and the
reports expanded to two volumes. Since then, the structure and
content of the reports have changed from time to time but the
volume of data collected has steadily expanded until now seven
volumes are published annually in addition to Mental and Tuber-
culosis Hospital statistics and numerous occasional studies on
manpower and salaries.
In dealing with the text data, a nitmber of points must be kept in
mind. First of all, "general and allied special hospitals" in the
D.B.S. data excludes all private hospitals since these do not report
the same detailed federal returns. In the total personal health care
expenditure, however, national health and welfare includes any
private hospital providing care under contract with a provincial
agency. The discrepancy is not large, but is just enough to keep the
numbers inconsistent! Data on number of hospitals and number of
beds in the text are taken from Canada, D.B.S., Hospital Statistics,
Vol. I—Hospital Beds, 1971, Ottawa, November 1973, historical data,
pp. 46—50. Patient days are adult and child only and include
chronic, convalescent, rehabilitation, and other specialties. Patient
days per thousand population were calculated by taking the re-
ported average daily number of patients for each year, multiplying
by 365 (or 366), and dividing by national population. Admissions
per thousand population were calculated by dividing reported total
admissions by population. The ratio of the two does not equal
reported mean stay per separation (discharge or death) presuma-
bly because in an expanding hospital sector, admissions systemati-
cally outran separations in every year.
This may not be the whole explanation; a number of small
arithmetic discrepancies turn up in this vast array of data, particu-
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flarly in earlier years. As mentioned in the text, total hospital beds in reporting int'
general and allied special hospitals seem to be undercounted in their wages.
1961. Data on p. 33 of Hospital Beds, 1971 suggest that in 1961 Canada, Do
about 1,800 chronic, convalescent, and rehabilitation beds were January—Jun
shifted to mental and "restored" the following year. quarterly sui
Costs per patient day in the text always refer to total expenditures The gener
per adult and child patient day, excluding new-borns. Earlier data emphasize c
sources often include new-borns, whole or part-weighted. Cost per to choose da
day back to 1956 is reported on pp. 28—30 of Canada, D.B.S., insurance r€
Hospital Statistics, Vol. VI: Hospital Expenditures, 1971, Ottawa, statistical da
October 1973. For the earlier years, data were taken from Hospital sponses of d
Statistics, Vol. II, Expenditures for each year. Reconstructing these the insuranc
data, however, it must be noted that prior to 1956 net expenditure well beyond
per patient day was reported, excluding courtesy rebates to staff of National I
and revenue from nurses' board. Reported patient day costs from Sourcesof I
89, Col. 5, of the 1953 publication ($11.95) have, for example, been Canada, 196
adjusted upward by the ratio of gross to net (p. 105), and similarly in that this pn
1954 and 1955. The 1953 total was then allocated by class of expanded in
expenditure using the proportions in Hospital Statistics, Vol. II, couldspend
88 (wages and salaries, drugs, etc.). No allocation by department of sources, v
was possible since throughout the 1950s reporting procedures oUtrUfl eith
permitted a very high "undistributed expenditure" component that pear favorab
was nearly a fifth of the total. The breakdown in 1971 used data
reported in tables 30—33 of Canada, D.B.S., Hospital Statistics, Vol.
VII: Hospital indicators, 1971, Ottawa, August 1973; Table 18 TES providedpaid hours data to compare with the hours data in Table NO
31 of Hospital Statistics, Vol. I, 1953. Historical length of stay and 1.Thus, the
occupancy data came from Hospital Statistics, Vol. 1, 1971, and all partment
1953 and 1971 disaggregated expenditure data came from Hospital national P
pubhcatio Statistics, Vol. VI, 1971, and Vol. II, 1953. in Canadi
Data for the subperiods between 1953 and 1971 are much less hospital a
comprehensive than one would like, because reporting categories federal go
and definitions kept changing so as to make the construction of long hospital 5
andconsistent series on the internal expenditure components of Year
hospitals rather difficult. Cross salaries and wages and paid hours
2.
are drawn from the 1953 Hospital Statistics, Vol. II. Gross salaries cost of su
and wages for 1959, 1965, and 1971 are drawn from Hospital covered
Statistics, Vol. VI. Expenditures and paid hours are from Hospital 3.Abriefhl
Statistics, Vol. VII, indicators. Data on numbers and wages of
Malcolm
professional and technical employees over the period 1961—1968
are taken from a series of twelve occasional papers published by Care in C
D.B.S., Health Manpower in Hospitals, 1961—1968, the first general "Medical
and each following paper covering eleven specific occupations and tional Me
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reporting inter alia the share of total hospital budgets made up by
their wages. Wages per paid hour by occupation in 1971 are from
Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Hospital Indicators,
January—June 1971, Ottawa, October 1971, which was based on the
quarterly survey but not reproduced in the annual volume.
The general principles followed in data preparation were, first, to
emphasize construction of consistent series overtime, and, second,
to choose data concepts as closely as possible related to potential
insurance responses or behavior. There is a huge quantity of
statistical data on hospitals that could be used to show the re-
sponses of detailed hospital budgets wherein shifts occurred after
the insurance programs were introduced; but such a project was
well beyond the resources available for this paper. The Department
of National Health and Welfare has made a good beginning with its
Sources of Increase in Budget Review Hospital Expenditures in
Canada, 1961 to 1971, Ottawa, December 1973. It is to be hoped
that this project will be pushed back to pre-insurance days and
expanded in detail, It would also be helpful if federal statisticians
could spend some time on indicating the appropriate reconciliation
of sources, where possible! So far, number generati9n has tended to
outrun either documentation or reconciliation, but the trends ap-
pear favorable.
NOTES
1.Thus, the federal publication Health Services in Canada 1973 (Ottawa: De-
partrnent of National Health and Welfare, 1973), which summarizes the
national programs, opens its first sentence by referring to the B.N.A. Act. This
publication, issued annually in previous years as Health and Welfare Services
itt Canada, is a good overview of the general provisions of the provincial
hospital and medical programs as well as the direct service programs of the
federal government. In earlier years it also provides a statistical sketch of the
hospital system at a point in time, amplifying material in the annual Canada
Year Book published by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics.
2.The federal government pays 25 per cent of each province's own per capita cost
for covered hospital services, plus 25 per cent of the national average per capita
cost of such services, plus 50 per cent of the national average per capita cost of
covered medical services, all multiplied by the provincial population.
3.A brief history of the development of health insurance in Canada is provided by
Malcolm C. Taylor, "The Canadian Health Insurance Program," Public Ad-
ministration Review, 33 (January—February 1973). Other brief descriptions are
J.E.F. Hastings, "Federal-Provincial Insurance for Hospital and Physician's
Care in Canada," International Journal of Health Services, 1(1971); R. Kohn,
"Medical Care in Canada," in J. Fry and W.A.J. Farndale (editors), Interna-
tional Medical Care (Oxford: Medical and Technical Publishing Co., 1972) and
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A. P. Ruderman, "The Organization and Financing of Medical Care in Can- 8.The nub
ada," in British Medical Association, Health Services Financing (London, 1970). turn over
Hastings tends to focus relatively more on current administrative questions and health cos
on the impact of health insurance on other health and social services and the provinces
organization of health personnel; Kohn provides a current snapshot description will keep
of health services, insured or uninsured, which tends to cover the "official" their plan
features with limited analysis; Ruderman in his description discusses the well asii
relativelylimited role of price and income effects in the Canadian system and scheme ii
arguesthat the private market economy approach is not and never was political u
particularly relevant. A more extensive history of the pre-Medicare nonprofit 9.Moreover
comprehensive insurance plans from which Medicare evolved is C. H. Shil- them "50
lington, The Road to Medicare in Canada (Toronto: Del Graphics, 1972). 10.R. C. Be
Symposia on the hospital system include the September 16, 1962 issue of dissertath
Hospitals: JA.H.A., Vol. 35, No. 18, and Medical Care, Vol. 7, No. 6, Supple- large fam
ment (November—December 1969). The cornerstones of description in Liberal g
field are, of course, the Report of the Royal Commission on Health Services removed
(Hall Commission) (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1964); and supporting 11.This is fl(
studies:the Report of the Commission d'enquète sur Ia sante et le bien-ètre Demandj
social (Castonguay-Nepveu Commission) (Quebec: Gouvernement de Québec, in the rel
1970); and The Report of the OntarioCommitteeon the Healing Arts et al., 'T
(Toronto: The Queen's Printer, 1969). Someone, somewhere, may have read all Care—TI
this. John Evans suggests that Canadians spend more time and effort studying (Novemb
health care than most other countries do delivering it; see "Physicians in a families,
Public Enterprise," Journal of Medical Education, 48 (November 1973). The "The Irnj
present author strives to uphold that tradition. Journal o
4.Taylor, op. cit. — although
5.It must be recalled, of course, that standards of services cannot be measured 12.Anne Sci
only by expenditure. The dramatic increase in provider incomes, physicians, sources
and hospital workers (see below), which have been the principal quantitative increasel
effect of health insurance, have tended to even out provincial differentials, result of
Thus, health providers have moved faster up the wage structure in poorer this.
provinces, without any observable associated improvement in health status. In short-run
medical care,however, much of thisbehavior pre-datedthefederal hospital
legislation—see R. C. Evans, Price Formation in the Market for Physician The hos1
Services 1957—1969 (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1972), Ch. 3, response
6.These terms are spelled out in more detail in the annual Health Services in would
Canada. The hospital program required participating provinces to sign an changed
agreement with the federal government detailing licensing, inspection, and
supervision requirements and federal audit. These requirements were not 13.It is, of c
imposed in the medical care plan, either as Taylor suggests because of the pubi
provincial objections to federal intervention, or because public regulation of spread 0
physiciansis a much more contentious issue than regulation of hospitals! 14.A detail
7.Administrative costs have certainly been held down—in 1971 prepayment and publishe
administration of health plans cost Canadians $5.54 per capita compared with Of' Natioi
$ 12.83 in the U.S.; total health expenditures per capita are $306.11 and $386.92. Return
Canada, Department of National Health and Welfare, National Health Expen- Fsnancia
ditures in Canada, 1960—1971 (Ottawa: 1973). (Both countries, of course, bury 15.In Quei
compliance costs in provider budgets, but it seems likely that compliance titioflar
costs are also lower given a uniform national system.) The bargain looks a activity
little different, of course, when one discovers that the existing system ofadmin- tenstiCS,
istration does not generate data sufficient to understand or control operating out,by A
expense! But at least the U.S. is no better off. Main-D
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8.The nub of the problem appears to be the desire of the federal government to
turn over tax revenues that will initially yield revenues higher than current
health costs but that will grow less rapidly (alcohol and tobacco levies). The
provinces prefer a larger income tax share, since the income elasticity of this tax
will keep pace with past rates of cost increase. The federal authorities note that
their plan provides incentives to rationalize delivery at the provincial level, as
well as initial resources to support change. The provinces argue that this
scheme imposes all the risks of cost containment on them (as well as the
political unpopularity).
9.Moreover, revenues thus collected are subtracted from shareable costs, making
them dollar" revenues from a provincial standpoint.
10.B. G. Beck, The Demand for Physicians' Services in Saskatchewan, Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Alberta, 1971. The charge also lowered use among
large families and aged-head families, and was politically unpopular. The
Liberal government that imposed it was defeated in 1971 and the charge
removed by the incoming N.D.P.
11.This is not solidly established but emerges in several studies—e.g., Beck, The
Densand for Physicians' Services in Saskatchewan, shows a steady weakening
in the relation between income and utilization after Medicare. P. E. Enterline
et ci., "The Distribution of Medical Services Before and After 'Free' Medical
Care—The Quebec Experience," New England Journal of Medicine, 289
(November 29, 1973), report a shift in number of visits—up for Lower-income
families, down for upper-income families, zero net change. B. E. Badgleyet ci.,
"The Impact of Medicare in Wheatville, Sasketchewan, 1960—1965," Canadian
Journal of Public Health, 58 (March 1967), show evidence of a similar shift,
although less concrete in the absence of visit data.
12.Anne Scitovsky has correctly pointed out that although this paper identifies
sources of expenditure increase in insured health care and relates them to
increased provider incomes, it does not establish that these developments are a
result of national health insurance. In some sense one could never establish
this. Who knows what would have happened? But it is true that although a
short-run expenditure response to national insurance is identifiable in both
hospital and medical care, the response of provider incomes are less clear-cut.
hospital response, if it is that, has a long lag, whereas the physician
response, on the contrary, may be merely a speeding up Of long-run trends that
would have happened anyway. If this all sounds a little ad hoc, it is. I've also
changed some of the hospital wage numbers and their explanation. I regret
undercutting Anne's comments but it made a better paper!
13.It is, of course, true that relative earnings of health care providers rose prior to
the public insurance plans as well. To what extent this was attributable to the
spread of private insurance no one knows.
14.A detailed description of the reporting is available in a pair of booklets
published annually by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics and the Department
of National Health and Welfare, Instructions and Definitions for the Annual
Return of Hospitals Form HS-1, Facilities and Services and Form HS-2,
Financial.
15.In Quebec the medical association collects additional data from each prac-
titioner on auxiliary personnel employed, hours of work, and distribution of
activity of hours of work. Analysis of the relationships among practice charac-
teristics, physician characteristics, and pattern of workload is now being carried
out by A. P. Contandriopoulos and J. M. Lance, "ModèLe de Prevision de Ia
Main-D'Oeuvre Medicale," Document de Travail No. 8, McGill University,
489 Insured Health Care in CanadaMay 1974. The authors express some reservations about the quality of the and extn
practice characteristics data. employe
16.Some efforts have been made to carry out such estimates—e.g., R. G. Evans, and sean
"Behavioural Cost Functions for Hospitals," Canadian Journal of Economics, 4 its coves
(May 1971); and R. G. Evans and H. D. Walker, "Information Theory and the any gene
Analysis of Hospital Cost Structure," Canadian Journal of Economics, 5 24.Saskatch
(August 1972). 1940s, lo
17.This view was still being urged in 1969; see Canada, Department of National "The Sa
Health and Welfare, Task Force Reports on the Costs of Health Services in Journal
Canada, Vol. III, pp. 170—182. That particular report, on medical prices, seems 25.Althougl
more concerned with physician autonomy. inpatien
18.Thus in 1970 the B.C. Medical Association promulgated a new fee schedule. of altern
The province declared it too high, and said that the plan would not pay it. The 26.On one
profession replied that its members would collect the increase from patients. all of the
The government advised patients not to pay, and published (by name) each by cutti
physician's gross receipts from the plan in the newspapers. The profession accomm
thereupon lowered its schedule and a compromise was adopted; but it worked is assert
to defeat the government at the next election. In most provinces the process is evidenc
less open. participi
19.This is an implication of empirical research in B.C. See R. C. Evans et at., 27.Evans,
"Medical Productivity, Scale Effects, and Demand Generation," Canadian "Inform
Journal of Economics, 4 (August 1973). It has also been commented on by in- 28.Ibid. TI
formed observers. (John Evans, "Physicians in a Public Enterprise.") particul
20.This was expressed as a positive goal in the Hall Commission Health Charter pound o
for Canada. "BASED on freedom of choice, and upon free and self-governing tive pre
professions Report of the Royal Commission, pp. 11—12. costs. T
21.These comparisons also illustrate the dangers of interpreting share movements, hospital
In 1961, a recession year, personal income was down and the jump in hospital 29.A cynic
share was accentuated. The long boom of the early sixties held the physician probler
share nearly constant from 1961 to 1966; only when the growth of the economy 30. C.
slowed did physicians' share move up again, of a Da
22.Canadian hospital accounts do not include employee benefits in gross salaries couver,
and wages but classify these as "supplies and other expense." These amount to 31.M. Feld
about 9 per cent of the total budget in recent years. (Notice that hospital
budgets include little or no capital expense.) In1969, radiologist and raise co
pathologist remuneration was transferred from "supplies and expense" to in long
"gross salaries and wages"; this amounts to about 2.5 per cent of total budget 32.J. L.
and has been transferred back to supplies and expense in this paper for Departs
consistency. The 1971 data also reflect an exclusion from hours worked of "Prepai
intern and resident time and classroom hours, thus biasing downward the (March'
change in hours per patient day from 1965 to 1971. The effect appears, 33.The bc
however, to be quantitatively insignificant (of the order of 0.2 to 0.3 hours per Commi
patient day). Project,
23.One study has been conducted that attempts to examine wage change by Ministe
employment category within the hospital labor force and relate such changes to recentl:
wages in similar occupations elsewhere in the economy: Canada, Department
of National Health and Welfare Research and Statistics Memo, Salaries and 34.The no
Wages in Canadian Hospitals 1962 to 1970, Ottawa, n.d. (1971). This source but affi
draws on data from the Department of Labour as well as D.B.S. and N.H.W. popula
Unfortunately, the longest data span assembled is 1962 to 1969, and in this case univers
the 1969 data are contaminated by failure to include a major subsequent much h
retroactive agreement in Quebec in 1970. The report is carefWly documented some m
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and extremely honest about its limitations; it does show that by 1969 hospital
employees in such service trade occupations as cooks, laundry workers, maids,
and seamstresses were paid well above their private industry counterparts. But
its coverage, both cross-sectionally and over time, is far too limited to support
any general conclusions.
24.Saskatchewan, typically, tried out a variety of innovative approaches in the
1940s, long before anyone else had considered the problem. See B. Roth et al.,
"The Saskatchewan Experience in Payment for Hospital Care," American
Journal of Public Health, 43 (June 1953).
25.Although in calculating savings to be achieved by reduced utilization of acute
inpatient facilities, for example, this distinction may be forgotten by exponents
of alternative programs.
26.On one occasion, however, the Minister of Health in B.C. simply refused to pay
all of the negotiated wage increases and forced hospitals to find the differential
by cutting staff or using their own revenue sources (e.g., the preferred
accommodation differential). The policy was monumentally unpopular, and it
is asserted that hospitals merely ran up their lengths of stay; but there is some
evidence that it slowed cost trends. In Quebec the provincial government has
participated directly in wage negotiations since 1966.
27.Evans, "Behavioural Cost Functions for Hospitals," and Evans and Walker,
"Information Theory and the Analysis of Hospital Cost Structure."
28.Ibid. These findings relate to aggregate hospital budgets. Some provinces,
particularly Quebec, are using cross-hospital subindexes, such as dollars per
pound of laundry processed, as control devices to identify and place administra-
tive pressure on hospitals that are above average on these direct departmental
costs. This may simply lead back to standardizing the internal structure of
hospital budgets—uniform inefficiency again.
29.A cynic might fear that better managers in the existing structure might make the
problem worse; they'll simply negotiate better for more money!
30.R. C. Evans and C. C. Robinson, An Evaluation of the Economic Implications
of a DayCare Surgery Unit,Final Report, N.H.W. Grant #610-21-14, Van-
couver, October 1973.
31.M. Feldstein, in "An Econometric Model of the Medicare System," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 85 (February 1971), reports that extended care facilities
raise costs per hospital episode—what is saved on lower acute care stays is lost
in long extended care stays.
32.J. L. McPhee, Community Health Association Clinics (Regina: Saskatchewan
Department of Public Health, August 1973); and J. E. F. Hastings et al.,
"Prepaid Group Practice in Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario: Part I," Medical Care,
(March—April 1973).
33.The locus classicus is the report of the Commission d'enquéte (Castonguay
Commission). The federal equivalent was the Community Health Centre
Project, directed by J. E. F. Hastings, which reported to the Council of Health
Ministers in July of 1972 and supported the C.H.C. concept strongly. More
recently the Report of the British Columbia Health Security Programme Project
(Victoria: December 1973) also endorsed the C.H.C. idea.
34.The nonprofits on which the national program was modeled, provincially based
but affiliated as Trans Canada Medical Plans, covered 30 per cent of the
population in 1967 (adding in the population of Saskatchewan, which had a
universal public plan since 1962). Coverage was, however, proportionally
much higher in the western provinces. Moreover, most of the population had
some medical coverage, although private insurance plans were more likely to
491 Insured Health Care in CanadaI
limit coverage to in-hospital care and/or impose copayment features. With
reference to the role of insurance in expanding demand for care, the TCMP 11 planshad an average cost per insured of $34.95 in 1967, compared with a
national average of $33.63 for medical expenditures of allCanadians.
Moreover, TCMP subscribers weje concentrated in high-cost provinces. See
Evans, Price Formation in the Market for Physician Services, Ch. 2; or Trans-
Canada Medical Plans, Annual EnroLlment Experience and Annual Financial New YorkUniversity
andStatistical Experience Report, 1967 Year (mimeo.), July 1968.
35.The itidexes are current-weighted composites derived from a sample of key
items in each provincial fee schedule, with the size of the sample growing over
time. By contrast, the C.PJ. Component (discontinued after Medicare) was a
base-weighted index of prices of four procedures performed by general Evans'pape
practitionersin urban areas, measured by telephone survey. For further "What Every
discussion,see R. C. Evans, Price Formation in the Market for Physician Insurance
Services,Ch. 1 and Appendix 1—2, where it is also shown that although the this cour proportionof specialists in Canada rose from 35 per cent in 1957 to just over 50
r'y
percent, the impact of this change on measured prices is almost certainly less privatepro
than10 per cent overall. approachar
36.The table suggests that this "quantity" increase has accelerated since Medi- sociallabors
care, but the 1971 increase is distorted by the massive effects of the introduc- federalstruc
tionof the Quebec program. In that province average gross incomes of hospitals, re
physicians jumped 38.9 percent, 1971 over 1970, and net incomes were up 50.1 respectto hi
per cent. Expenses of practice rose 8.6 per cent on average. This leads to the witha leadir
suspicion that there was substantial under-reporting of income in Quebec prior In preparii
to1971.
th tho
37.There are a few conceptual discrepancies in moving from physicfkns to emeap
physicianservices. See Earnings of Physicians in Canada, 1961—1971. variable, ho
38.Enterline et al., "The Distribution of Medical Services Before and After 'Free' rewardingri
Medical Care"; and A. D. MacDonald et al, "Physician Service in Montreal Beginniflç
BeforeUniversal Health Insurance," Medical Care, 11 (July—August 1973). British Norti
39.Evans, Price Formation in the Market for Physician Services, Ch. 4. apparently I
40.Regie de du Quebec,Annual Statistics 1972, Quebec, n.d. roughly unif
41.This whole paragraph is in response to Anne comment that this insuranceb
paper really says more about the forces driving expenditure increase than about hospital pla
the role of health insurance, and that its treatment of the impact of insurance on the medical physician incomes was inconsistent.I have attempted to rationalize the
inconsistency, but I confess I do not know the answer. considera
42.Within B.C., however, the effects of differing physician density across regions ofpaying Pt
on regional provider incomes seem to have been almost entirely (about 85 per are depicte
cent) wiped out by variations in practice patterns; Evans et al., "Medical diversity th;
Productivity, Scale Effects, and Demand Generation." circumstaflC
43.This is, of course, a growing view in the U.S., V. Fuchs and M. Kramer, Ten numt
Determinants of Expenditures for Physicians' Services in the United States on the data
1948—1968 (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, Occasional of trend dat
Paper No. 117, 1972) being perhaps its leading exponents. The discretionary carerices
behaviorof the physician and his influence over demand emerges also in the
workof M. Feldstein, U. Reinhardt, and J. Newhouse, often by default. uetaiY P
44.Moreover, if copayment were to become large enough to reduce demand and United Stat
utilization, private insurance would return for the good the paper it
45.J. Y. Rivard, La Remuneration du corps medical, Annexe 13 to the Castonguay discussant
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Evans' paper is really a short monograph that might just as well be entitled
"What Every Interested American Ought to Know about Canadian Health
Insurance." The Canadian experience with health insurance is important to
this country because (1)it has coupled public financing with continued
private production of health services; (2) variation among its provinces in
approach and in timing has produced evidence from several significant
social laboratories; and (3) a good many Canadian institutions, including the
federal structure of government and relationships between physicians and
hospitals, resemble our own. In chronological time, Canadian actions with
respect to health insurance have preceded ours, so that they may provide us
witha leading indicator.
In preparing this paper, Evans has intentionally cast a wide net. To continue
the metaphor, he has achieved a substaQtial catch. The quality of the catch is
variable, however. The paper could benefit from more work;itaffords
rewarding reading even now.
Beginning with an elegant introduction to the Canadian Constitution (the
British North America Act), Evans relates how a central government that
apparently lacks authority in the health field has managed to establish a
roughly uniform nationwide system of nearly universal hospital and medical
insurance by wielding the instrument of federal-provincial cost sharing. The
hospital plan went into operation in the prbvinces in the period 1958—1961;
the medical plan, in 1968—1970. Evans describes the two insurance plans in
considerable detail—their respective benefits, sources of financing, methods
of paying providers, and the basic data systems. Both structure and function
are depicted with a broad brush, but also with a sense of the degree of
diversity that characterizes the several Canadian provinces. (Under the
circumstances, the latter aspect is not quite systematic.)
Ten numbered tables plus four more text tables, supported by an appendix
on the data sources and on the splicing of time series, constitute a gold mine
of trend data on personal health expenditures in Canada by object, on health
care prices, and on health services utilization. Several tables also furnish
detail by province. At almost every point the data beg for comparison with the
United States; in small measure I shall try to respond to this need. Throughout,
the paper invites more detailed description or more refined analysis; for this a
discussant can only encourage the author to continue his good work and to
amplify it.
493 Insured Health Care in CanadaPOLICY PROPOSITIONS
Owing to time limitations in preparing the paper, Evans' policy propositions
are not so well supported by the analyses developed in the paper at hand as
they might be. Nevertheless, Evans is both a scholar and a man of experience,
and his views on policy are worthy of respect for themselves. More important
for this context, however, his policy views help the reader to understand why
certain problems were selected for study and others were neglected.
Itrust that what follows is a fair presentation of Evans' policy propositions
stemming from his interpretation of the Canadian experience with health
insurance:
1.Copayment by consumers is beside the point, for physician behavior is
dominant. (In a footnote Evans adds: if copayment turned out to be
important enough, private health insurance would sell policies to cover
it.)
2.It is difficult to discover incentives toward greater managerial efficiency
if managers are not allowed to do anything much with the savings they
achieve or to apply them toward doing a better job.
3.Profiles and audits of providers are of limited value. They can only
detect fraud.
4.It follows that itis necessary to try to control the flow of funds. The
question, which is nOt answered, is how.
5.It comes down to this: Health insurance is a limited device. Com-
plementary instruments are required.
6.As a practical matter, it is important to take steps to curtail the supply of
hospital beds.
7.Canada will move toward a policy of restricting the number of physi-
cians.
None of these propositions strikes me as unreasonable or implausible.
Indeed, Iincline to put even greater emphasis on a reduction in the supply of
hospital beds in the long run. With respect to physicians, itis essential to
explore the implications of their relationship with hospitals.
THIRD PARTIES AND CONSUMERS
Evans concludes that the economic relationships between third parties and
consumers in Canada are relatively uninteresting. Why? He gives these
reasons.
1.The existing system of health insurance premiums is pointless.
2.There isa scattering of utilization charges among the provinces,
without rationale.
3.Utilization charges are probably costly to collect.
4.Extra billing by physicians is trivial (in contrast to the United States
experience under Medicare).
Evans' conclusion on this score is important not only for policy purposes,
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relationships, those between third parties and providers. It would be highly
useful, therefore, to document this conclusion. Of special interest are case
materials that attempt to describe which policies have been tried and what
ensued. Such materials serve administrators of health plans; they also shed
light on the inferences drawn from quantitative studies.
THIRD PARTIES AND PROVIDERS' EARNINGS
For Evans, the economic relationships between payment agencies and
providers of health services are at the heart of the Canadian health insurance
system. How can this be, given the original lack of intention and desire on the
part of government to intervene in the provision of services?
His answer is that certain consequences of health insurance were not
foreseen. Utilization of services has increased somewhat; more expensive
techniques are being adopted; and, in an open-ended payment system,
providers revise their income aspirations upward.
Indeed, for Evans, the most prominent effect of health insurance in Canada
has been the increase of earnings by health providers, both physicians and
hospitals. Two factors are involved: (1) the policy adopted at the outset to pay
all legitimate bills and to minimize interference with management; and (2) the
inadequacy of the information structure on which intervention on the supply
side might be based. -
PHYSICIANS
Closer examination of the Canadian data, as well as comparison with data for
the United States in the same intervals, suggests that in the case of physician
services, health insurance must have been only one of the factors involved, for
it appeared rather late. Table 1 presents annual rates of increase in expendi-
tures in both countries; to show the component factors as well and to save
space, panel A is for Canada and panel B is for the United States.
Early in the 1960s expenditures for physician services rose at the same
rates in the two countries—7 to 8 per cent a year. The figure rose in both
countries to 10 per cent a year by 1965. After that the Canadian rate of
increase was higher, 13 vs. 10 per cent by 1968, and still higher in the next
interval, 16 vs. 11 per cent.
However, the Canadian data indicate an increase in the per capita use of
services of 11 per cent in the last interval. The figure is dubious on several
grounds: Itis considerably higherthan any past figure; it is accompanied bya
low—indeed, lower—rate of price increase; and it departs appreciably from
the United States experience. It is not unreasonable to postulate some spillover
between the United States and Canada.
Insured Health Care in CanadaInterval Expenditures Population Price PerCapitaUse
A.Canada
1953—1956 10.8% 3.0% N/A N/A
1956—1959 10.7 3.1 N/A N/A
1959—1962 7.7 2.3 2.0% 3.4%
1962—1965 10.3 2.1 2.3 5.8
1965—1968 13.1 2.0 . 5,0 5.7 •
1968—1971 16.2 1.5 3.0 11.3
B.United States
1950—1955 6.0% 1.7% 3.4% 0.9%
1955—1960 9.1 1.7 3.3 4.1
1960—1962 7.0 1.6 2.6 2.8
1962—1965 10.4 1.4 2.6 6.4
1965—1968 9.8 1.1 6.2 2.5
1968—1971 10.9 0.9 7.1 2.9
One can only surmise about plausible explanations. Isit possible that
medical insurance in Canada, by establishing a single source of payment
within a province, led simultaneously to a more correct reporting of earnings
by physicians? Ifso, there would be a one-time shift in the data base.
Utilization changes would be overstated, if price increases were understated
for whatever reason. An improved ratio of collections to charges would serve
to increase earnings while ofticial prices remained the same. In the United
States there is good reason to believe that after 1965 the fractionation of fees
became widespread, thereby understating the officialriseinfees; has
Canada had a similar experience?
Certainly the fact of an appreciable increase in physician earnings is not
contestable. However, because of the high increase in per capita utilization
reported in his data, Evans may be neglecting prices unduly overthe long run.
Evans appropriately emphasizes the discretion of the physician in prescrib-
ing additional visits and services.In the United States Rappleye' and
Ginzberg2 have, long made this the core of their policy positions on health
manpower. Fuchs and Kramer offer this ability of physicians to generate more
services as their preferred explanation of the statistical significance of the



















TABLE 1Physician Services: Annual Rates of Increase
in Expenditures, Population, Price, and per
Capita Use, Canada and the United States,
Selected Intervals
souRcEs: Canada—Evans' paper provides basic data for my computations.
Unit ad States—Herbert E. Klsrman. Dorothy P. Rice, Barbara L. Cooper, and H. Louis Steflier, Sources
of Increase in Selected Medical Cain Expenditures, 1929—1969 (Washington, D.C., Social Security
Administration, 1970): for subsequent years. Social Security Administration. unpublished data.
HOSPITALS
In Canada, a






























distinguish between influence on quantity of service and on price when he
recognizes that the reward of physicians must be such "as may give them that
rank in society which so important a trust requires."4 To have better judgment
on the Canadian fee data, more needs to be known than is reported in this
paper about how physicians are actually paid. May Iadd that Evans is
uniquely able to furnish such information.0
There is a wealth of provincial data that Evans does not explore and that I
am unable to handle. Take Saskatchewan, for example. Table 6 shows it to
have been successful in keeping down physician services expenditures.
How? Not by keeping down the number of physicians; its supply rose at the
overall Canadian rate, according to Table 9. What about its fee level? Well, it
rose at a rate slightly higher than for Canada, according to Table 6; or it may
have risen at a lower rateinrecent years, according to Table 10. A
reconciliation of the tee data, which are undoubtedly ambiguous in spots,
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HOSPITALS
In Canada, average earnings of hospital employees have increased by 8 per
cent a year. For a similar period, earnings of hospital employees in the United
States rose by 5 per cent a year.
Evans asks whether the increase in average employee earnings reflects in
part a higher personnel mix. Data bearing directly on the question are not
available to him, but on balance he concludes that a change in personnel mix
probably had nothing to do with it. For the United States, Feldstein reports a
reduction in the average skilllevel of hospital workers. This trend was
TABLE 2 Hospitals: Annual Rates of Increase
in Cost Components, Canada, 1953-1971,
and the United States, 1955-1968
Cost Component Canada United States
Average Cost/Patient Day 9.3% 7.8%
Labor Cost/Patient Day 10.5 7.5
Personnel/Patient Day 2.1 2.3
Average Annual Eamirigs 8.3 5.1
Nonlabor Cost/Patient Day 7.2 8.2
Proportion Labor to Total:
Initial Year 57.7 61.7
Terminal Year 70.3 59.6
SOURCES: Canada—Computed from basic data in Evans' paper.
United States—Martin S. Fetdstein, The Rising Cost of !-Iospital care (Washington, D.C.: Infor-
mation Resources Press, 1971), p. 17.
497 Insured Health Care in Canadacoupled with increases in wages for some hospital occupations that brought
them to levels above those in other industries.6
Although staffing ratios are lower in Canada than in the United States (and
appropriately so, given the longer average duration of stay in the former—i 3.3
hours per patient day vs. 14.9 hours), the rate of increase in the former still
lags—2.1 vs. 2.3 per cent a year (Table 2). However, labor cost per patient
day has increased at a higher rate in Canada, owing to the higher rate of
increase in average earnings. The result, which is not easy to understand, is
that in Canada labor costs have risen to 70 per cent of total cost from a base
year figure of 58 per cent, whereas in the United States the trend was
gradually downward, from 62 to 60 per cent (Table 2).
A possible approach to reconciling some of these divergent tendencies is
to examine differences in the definition of accounts. In the United States fringe
benefits are classified as nonlabor expenses: are they so classified in
Canada? In the United States nonlabor expenses incorporate increasing
amounts of depreciation, which used to be neglected; does the situation differ
in Canada?
Evans concludes that wage inflationis the main source of increase in
hospital expenditures in Canada. The timing of the wage inflation does not
correspond to the extension of health insurance, nor to the increase in hospital
use, nor even to the expansion of hospital employment. Indeed, the increase
in use was small, and corresponded to the increase in hospital beds. It is not
clear what led to the increase in wages. From the experience of the United
States after Medicare, either of two explanations is tenable: the and
then operation of universal hospital insurance; or the method employed to pay





















REGULATION OR CONTROL THROUGH REIMBURSEMENT
For both types of provider, Evans stresses the importance of negotiated
earnings and sees no obvious basis for the exercise of restraint.
He mentions the accumulation of a formidable hospital data base and
regrets the failure hitherto to apply it. He looks forward to better coding and
machine processing of the data. Furthermore, he would employ the data to
explain differences in cost among hospitals and to set prices for inpatient and
outpatient services. For these purposes direct departmental expenses, with-
out any allocation of overhead, are useless, in Evans' opinion.
Here I differ. The fact is that economists do not yet know how to explain cost
differences among hospitals. Moreover, for a multiproduct firm,itis not
possible to calculate the average cost of each product: only the marginal cost
is calculable.7 If so, what is the use of allocating overhead expenses? At least
direct departmental expenses can help in making comparisons within a
hospital over time and among institutions, preferably also over time.
Evans is doubtful about the efficacy of close monitoring of institutions to
Anne A.



















499 In:achieve greater efficiency. Believing that he is right,I should still like to see
some documentation from the Canadian experience.
Evans concludes from his study of Canadian health insurance that the
supply side is crucial. Again Itend to agree; the study of demand has
preoccupied us unduly. It is salubrious to hear a call for increased concentra-
tion on supply factors at a conference devoted exclusively to the economics of
health insurance.
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Like Professor Kiarman, I am much impressed by Professor Evans' paper. He
has tackled a formidable problem and really combined threeif not four
different papers in one. There is, to begin with, a historical-descriptive section
on the organization of national health insurance in Canada. This is followed,
first, by a detailed analysis of the rise in hospital expenditures in the period
1953—1971, and then by a somewhat less detailed analysis of the increase in
physician expenditures in the period 1957—1971. Finally, the sections on
hospital and physician expenditures contain a discussion and evaluation of
government policy responses to hospital cost inflation as well as Professor
Evans' own recommendations on how to solve the problem of medical care
cost inflation in Canada. He has assembled and analyzed a vast body of data
thatI am sure future researchers will heavily draw from. Let me therefore
preface my comments by saying that any criticisms Ihave are minor
compared to the job he has done.
My main comment is that Professor Evans' paper is not so much a study of
the effects of national healt,h insurance in Canada as an analysis of the
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ng of institutions toincrease in hospital expenditures in the period 1953—1971 and in physician even when hE
expenditures in the period 1957—1971. Early in his introductory section, he of the increa
does say: '...the single most prominent influence of health insurance in possibility th
Canada has been to increase the earnings of health providers." The earnings of very low w
of health providers, both in the hospital sectdr and in the physician sector, did 1971, the
indeed rise very substantially during these periods. But his data do not really average indu
show that this was the result of national health insurance, of data on ft
For example, he shows that hospital workers' wage rates as well as gross prevent him
wages and salaries per patient day actually rose /ess in the period 1959—1965 increase in h
(the immediate post-hospital insurance period) than in either the preceding or Ialso wan
the subsequent six-year periods. He himself seems to change his mind about Evans, 70 pe
what exactly health insurance had to do with the inflation of costs as he labor cost; in
proceeds to analyze the data in detail. In the section on hospital casts, he in Canada, h
refers to a Canadian government report an hospital expenditures over the workers per
period 1961—1971 and says: "In analyzing the response of hospital expendi- States it was
ture to insurance ...the message of the report parallels that of this figures for co
paper—wage inflation in the hospital sector is the main source of increase Canadian fig
and the timing does not particularly correspond to the extension of insurance, include somt.
the expansion of utilization, or even the expansion of employment" (italics . employahig
mine). Actually, let me add that what increase in utilization there has been hemthe long
also does not seem to correspond to the extension of insurance. As Table 4 1971 in Cana
shows, the rate of increase in utilization, in terms of both admissions and higher averal
patient days per 1,000 population, was slower in the post-insurance than in are the most
the pre-insurance period. Only employment as measured by hours worked per ing room, x-n
patient day shows some relation to the extension of insurance, As the table on want to belat
p. 457 shows,itrose at a somewhat faster ratein the post-insurance To turn to
period—22.6 per cent between 1959 and 1965 as against 15.2 per cent already said,
between 1953 and 1959; however, this increase accounts foronly a very small 1957—1964 v
part of the increase in average labor costs per patient day between 1959 and point betwee
1965. Thus, the role of national health insurance is a relatively minor factor in care was en
explaining the increase in hospital costs, and we have to look to other factors introduced p
for an explanation. 1970, and on
This Professor Evans does very thoroughly and, I think, successfully, in the of the chang
hospital sector of the paper, and more superficially in the physician sector. To Any
begin with the hospital part of his paper, his data bear out his thesis that it was index used
supplier behavior—the rapid considerable increase in hospital workers' exactly isin
wages and inlabor costs per patient day—that was the' major factor implications
underlying the increase. However, although he shows that the rise in wage He himself
rates cannot be explained as demand-induced wage inflation resulting from , prices really
expanded employment, he does not really come up with a satisfactory apparent
explanation. He explores various possible explanations. For example, he by price chal
considers that there may have been a shift in the mix of hospital personnel Again, a bit I
from less-skilled to more-skilled workers, but concludes that this was not the 56 per cent
case, although here his data are not entirely satisfactory. He also explores the per physicia
possibility that the phasing out of unpaid or almost unpaid workers (student tions). A m
nurses, nursing assistants, and interns), which in 1953 accounted for about reasons for b
17—18 per cent of hours worked per patient day, may have been a factor. But n a paper of
500
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even when he adjusts for this change he finds that it explains only a small part
of the increase in hospital wage rates (about 24 per cent). He mentions the
possibility that hospital workers' wages were still catching up from the period
of very low wages during the period of charity hospitals, and he shows that in
1971, the average hourly hospital wage was still somewhat below that of the
average industrial hourly wage—$3.26 compared to $3.44. Unfortunately, lack
of data on the mix of skills in both the hospital and the industrial sectors
prevent him from pursuing this possible explanation. The reason for the
increase in hospital wages is therefore left largely unexplained.
Ialso want to raise a question that bothers me. According to Professor
Evans, 70 per cent of the average cost per patient day in Canada in 1971 was
labor cost; in the United States in the same year, it was about 58 per cent. Yet
in Canada, hours worked per patient day in 1971 were 13.29, or 1.66 hospital
workers per day, assuming an eight-hour work day, whereas in the United
States it was 3.01 workers per day. What is the explanation? Do the U.S.
figures for cost per patient day include some costs that are not included in the
Canadian figures? Or do the Canadian figures for labor cost per patient day
include something not included in the U.S. figures? Or do Canadian hospitals
employ a higher proportion of highly skilled employees? The explanation may
lie in the longer average length of stay in Canada than in the U.S. (11.3 days in
1971 in Canada as against 8.03 days in the U.S.). Since shorter stays result in
higher average costs per day because the first few days of any hospital stay
are the most expensive, involving a high percentage of nonlabor costs (operat-
ing room, x-rays, lab tests, etc.), this seems one possible explanation. I don't
want to belabor this point, but it does intrigue me.
To turn to the physician expenditures part of Professor Evans' paper, as I
already said, his analysis here is less thorough. He compares the period
1957—1964 with the period 1964—1971. His choice of 1964 as the dividing
point between the pre- and post-Medicare periods puzzles me since Medi-
care was enacted only in 1966, and all but one of the ten provinces have
introduced programs only quite recently—one in 1968, five in 1969, two in
1970, and one in 1971. In addition,I have some questions about his analysis
of the changes in expenditures that occurred in the period 1957—1971.
Any analysis of physician expenditures hinges on the adequacy of the
index used to deflate expenditures. Professor Evans does not tell us what
exactly is included in the new N.H.W. benefits paid index nor what the
implications of linking the old CPI physician fee index to the new index are.
He himself seems to have some doubts about the index since he says:'If list
prices really reflected actual prices over this period, one would derive an
apparent quantity increase for 1957—1971 by dividing expenditure change
by price change—this quantity estimate increases by 8.0 per cent per year."
Again, a bit later, he says: "If one accepted the Table 7 list price increase of
56 per cent from 1957 to 1971, the implicit average increase in real output
-r physician would be 4.1 per cent per year (italics mine in both quota-
A more detailed explanation of the index, and Professor Evans'
reasons for being so tentative about it, would therefore seem to be called for
in a paper of this kind.
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Not knowing what exactly the fee/benefit index reflects leaves it to the U.S., for exai
reader to speculate about what of the causes of the increased "real" would explai
output might be, especially since Professor Evans does not make much of an In conclusi
attempt to explain it. He does state that the stock of physicians rose twice as that copaym
fast as population in the period 1957—1971. But this does not explain the medical car
increase in'real" output per physician. On the basis of some fragmentary copayment
evidence, he doubts that physician visit rates have increased. He concludes, that some c
therefore, that the increase in'real" output is attributable to the fact that strongly, and
physicians to a large extent are able to determine the demand for their on suppliers
services and, as he puts it, 'manipulate utilization to generate income." I am since they t(
the first to agree that the physician can and does play an important role in services but
determining the demand for his services, and have argued so for a long time. said recently
Undoubtedly this explains a good part of the increased "real" output. But agree with Pi
another possible contributory factor that Professor Evans does not mention is have no cow
the possible increase in the percentage of specialists as against general
practitioners. This may, of course, be accounted for in the index but, as I said,
I have no way of knowing. If it is not, and there was such a shift in Canada, this
could explain at least part of the increased "real" output since specialists not
only charge higher fees than GP's but also generate more ancillary services
such as lab tests and x-rays per visit.It would be interesting to know,
therefore, if and in what way the distribution of Canadian physicians by field of
specialty changed in the period 1957—1 971,
Just one more point on this subject. Many physicians undoubtedly "manipu-
late" demand to increase their income by ordering too many lab tests & x-rays
or by performing marginal or even unnecessary surgery; or, as Professor
Evans points out, they may "shift across fee schedule items from, for example,
'ordinary' to 'complete' office examinations." But there are also other changes
in practice patterns that increase physician income and are not quite in the
same "manipulative" category. Take, for example, a fairly recent study of "The
Effects of 'Free' Medical Care on Medical Practice—the Quebec Experience,"
reported by Philip Enterline in the New England Journal of Medicine (May 31,
1973). He interviewed a random sample of Montreal physicians before and
after the Province of Quebec put Medicare in effect in November 1970 (the
surveys were done October 1969—May 1970 and October 1971—May 1972).
He found that the total number of all patient contacts declined by almost 10
per cent in the post-Medicare period. However, when you look at the change
by type of contact, you find that total face-to-face contacts increased by 4.8
per cent. Telephone contacts declined by 41 per cent, office visits increased
by 32 per cent, hospital inpatient visits dropped by 16 per cent, hospital clinic
visits stayed about the same, and home visits dropped by 63 per cent. This
change in practice patterns undoubtedly raised physicians' incomes, since
telephone calls are probably rarely charged for and since home visits (at least
in the U.S.) are relatively underpriced in relation to other types of visits (a
doctor can see several patients in his office—at a fee not much lower than that
for a home visit—for every one home visit he makes and thus make more
money). If this type of change in practice patterns occurred in other parts of
Canada, either as a result of Medicare or because of a long-term trend (in the
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)hysicians by field of
U.S. for example, there has been a steady decline in home visits), this also
would explain some of the increase in "real" output.
In conclusion, let me say that I am in full agreement with Professor Evans
that copayment on the part of patients is not the answer to stemming the rise in
medical care costs, or rather not the sole answer. Ido not think that
copayment is as ineffective as Professor Evans seems to think, and I believe
that some copayment on the part of patients is desirable. ButIfeel very
strongly, and have argued so in a recent paper, that some forms of restraints
on suppliers of medical services have to be devised—primarily on physicians
since they to a large extent determine not only the demand for their own
services but the demand for hospital services. The hospitals, as somebody
said recently, don't have patients—they only have doctors. I am not sure that I
agree with Professor Evans' recommended solution, but I have to admit that I
have no counter-proposal.
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